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The "implicit minority discount," or "IMD," is a fairly new concept in
Delaware appraisal law. A review of the case law discussing the concept,
however, reveals that it has emerged haphazardly and has not been fully
tested against principles that are generally accepted in the financial com-
munity. While control share blocks are valued at a premium because of the
particular rights and opportunities associated with control, these are ele-
ments of value that cannot fairly be viewed as belonging either to the corpo-
ration or its shareholders. In corporations with widely dispersed sharehold-
ings, the firm is subject to agency costs that must be taken into
consideration in determining going concern value. A control-block-oriented
valuation that fails to deduct such costs does not represent the going con-
cern value of the firm. As a matter of generally accepted financial theory,
on the other hand, share prices in liquid and informed markets do generally
represent that going concern value, with attendant agency costs factored or
priced in. There is no evidence that such prices systematically and continu-
ously err on the low side, requiring upward adjustment based on an "im-
plicit minority discount."
Given the lack of serious support for the IMD in finance literature, this
Article suggests that the Delaware courts may be relying on the IMD as a
means to avoid imposing upon squeezed-out minority shareholders the costs
of fiduciary misconduct by the controller. Where either past or estimated fu-
ture earnings or cash flows are found to be depressed as a result offiduciary
misconduct, however, or where such earnings or cash flows fail to include
elements of value that belong to the corporation being valued, the appropri-
ate means to address the corresponding reduction in the determination of
'fair value" is an upward adjustment to those earnings or cash flows.
This approach to the problem of controller opportunism is more direct,
more comprehensive in its application, and more in keeping with prevailing
financial principles than the IMD that the Delaware courts have applied in
the limited context of comparable company analysis. The Delaware courts
can therefore comfortably dispense with resorting to the financially unsup-
ported concept that liquid and informed share markets systematically under-
state going concern value.
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INTRODUCTION
Our recent article on the subject of share valuation began with the
observation that the 1983 Weinberger decision' "revolutionized ap-
praisal law.",2  One of Weinbergds critical (although perhaps long-
overdue) contributions was its recognition that in assessing share
value in appraisal cases, courts should be guided by "proof of value by
any techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable
in the financial community."
3
For many decades the Delaware courts have embraced a standard
of valuation in appraisal cases that awards dissenting stockholders
I Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
2 Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in
Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 119, 121 (2005).
3 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713.
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their proportional share of the value of the "going concern." 4 In the
years after Weinberger admonished that valuation should employ tech-
niques generally acceptable in the financial community, Delaware's
"going concern" standard has had a largely happy and fruitful mar-
riage with modem principles of finance. Under those principles, the
value of the firm, of which the dissenting stockholders receive a pro-
portionate share, is represented by the net present value of the firm's
future free cash flows. With Weinberger's salutary blessing, this ap-
proach to valuation has come to dominate Delaware valuation pro-
6ceedings. Most commonly identified as the "discounted cash flow" or
"DCF" approach, this valuation approach fits comfortably within the
legal parameters of appraisal proceedings. Under those parameters,
stockholders in appraisal proceedings, who by statute may not share in
the benefits arising from the transaction giving rise to the appraisal
proceeding,' do not receive a value that includes synergies or benefits
of control;8 nor do they receive a value that fails to take into account
the agency costs that are part of the corporation's "operative reality" 9
and that are therefore a component of the anticipated free cash flows
of the going concern.'°
4 E.g., Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 553 (Del. 2000) (citing Tri-
Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950)). For a list of additional recent
cases discussing the concept of "going concern value," see Hamermesh & Wachter, su-
pra note 2, at 132 n.56 (citing cases using the term "going concern value").
5 See discussion infra Part lI.A.
6 See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 2, at 125 n.30 (citing appraisal cases rely-
ing on DCF analysis); see also In re PNB Holding Co. S'holders Litig., No. 28-N, 2006
Del. Ch. LEXIS 158, at *95 (Aug. 18, 2006) (selecting the DCF valuation approach
over comparable companies and comparable acquisition methods); Del. Open MRI
Radiology Assocs. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 331 (Del. Ch. 2006) (using the DCF valua-
tion method when both parties' experts did); Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., No.
20336, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, at *35 (Aug. 19, 2005) (noting the frequent use of
the DCF method in Delaware valuation proceedings).
7 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2006) (excluding from "fair value" any ele-
ments of value arising from the merger or consolidation giving rise to the appraisal
proceeding).
8 See, e.g., Andaloro, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, at *70 n.74 (noting that the going
concern value standard requires excluding synergies attributable to business combina-
tion); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Group, Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 356
(Del. Ch. 2003) ("[T]his court must endeavor to exclude from any appraisal award the
amount of any value that the selling company's shareholders would receive because a
buyer intends to operate the subject company, not as a stand-alone concern, but as a
part of a larger enterprise, from which synergistic gains can be extracted.").
9 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996).
10 Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 2, at 139-40.
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As sometimes happens in rapidly developing bodies of law, how-
ever, a doctrinal weed sprung up in the late 1990s in what was other-
wise a largely harmonious, well-tended garden of finance and law. In
a rapid succession of cases over a period of less than ten years, there
developed what is now known in the Delaware case law as the "implicit
minority discount," or "IMD."" It is this recently sprouted concept
that is the central focus of this Article.
The financial/empirical assertion of the IMD is quite simple: no
matter how liquid and informed the financial markets may be, all pub-
licly traded shares persistently and continuously trade in the market at a
substantial discount relative to their proportionate share of the value of
the corporation.12 This discount, it is said, arises because the stock
prices on national securities markets represent "minority" positions,
and minority positions trade at a discount to the value of the company's
equity. '3 The consequence of the IMD in appraisal proceedings is lim-
ited in scope, but substantial in scale: in applying a valuation technique
(known as "comparable company analysis," or "CCA' 4) that estimates
subject company value by reference to market trading multiples ob-
served in shares of comparable publicly traded firms, the result must be
adjusted upward by adding a premium to offset the "implicit minority
discount" asserted to exist in the comparable companies' share 
prices.'5
In the last several years, the size of this upward adjustment (and the
supposed discount that it "corrects") has been routinely fixed, even
without supporting expert testimony, at 30%.' G
As we show below,' 7 however, not a single piece of financial or em-
pirical scholarship affirms the core premise of the IMD-that public
company shares systematically trade at a substantial discount to the net
present value of the corporation. To the contrary, the one treatise on
See infra Parts I.B-D (discussing the development of the IMD).
12 See, e.g., Agranoffv. Miller, 791 A.2d 880, 897 (Del. Ch. 2001) (finding that the
use of public company share price data gives rise to "an equity value that includes an
inherent minority trading discount, because the method depends on comparisons to
market multiples derived from trading information for minority blocks of the compa-
rable companies").
is Id.; see also infra Part I.D.
14 See, e.g., Borruso v. Commc'ns Telesys. Int'l, 753 A.2d 451, 458 (Del. Ch. 1999)
(applying the IMD to "the comparable company method of analysis").
Id.; see also infta Part I.D.
16 See, e.g., Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., No. 19734, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75,
at *48 (May 21, 2004) (applying a 30% premium to share value based solely upon re-
cent precedent).
17 See infra Part Ill.
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which the Delaware courts have repeatedly relied in invoking the IMD
has, in its most recent edition, explicitly warned against routinely apply-
ing an upward adjustment in order to offset some supposed IMD.'8
Moreover, the Delaware courts' application of the IMD has ren-
dered their valuation jurisprudence internally inconsistent. Even as
they have recently come to insist on adjusting for the putative IMD
when using a CCA, the Delaware courts have consistently (and prop-
erly) declined to make any such upward adjustment to the results of
discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis. That position stems from the
courts' correct recognition that DCF analysis can provide the best
measure of the value of the enterprise and that the value of the enter-
prise, after deducting off the value of the debt, measures the value of
the firm to its equity holders and thus its going concern value. No ad-
justments are necessary to the DCF method to offset any implicit mi-
nority discount. And indeed, the courts make no such adjustment,
even when the DCF analysis relies on market multiples-in substance,
a CCA approach-to estimate terminal value."
Fortuitously, in some cases, where allegations of incumbent board
wrongdoing are combined with the appraisal case, the IMD may result
in the correct answer when it offsets an incumbent controller's wrong-
ful acts. But, as we have argued previously,20 that result can be
achieved more directly by accepting petitioner's evidence that the re-
spondent's anticipated cash flow projections or other operational per-
formance measures are too low. In short, our core submission is that
the Delaware courts, in their valuation of shares (particularly in
squeeze-out mergers), should abandon the IMD and rely instead on a
more direct approach to addressing concerns about past or future
1
18 See infra text accompanying notes 131-132 (citing S.P. PRATr ET AL., VALUING A
BusINESS (4th ed. 2000)).
1 See, e.g., Gray v. Cytokine Pharmascis., Inc., No. 17451, 2002 WL 853549, at *11
(Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002) (conducting a DCF analysis without adjusting the result to ac-
count for an IMD), affd, 588 A.2d 255 (Del. 1991); Neal v. Ala. By-Products Corp., No.
8282, 1990 WL 109243, at *7-8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990) (same); Cavalier Oil Corp. v.
Harnett, No. 7959, 1988 WL 15816, at *29-30 (Del. Ch. 1988) (favoring a DCF analysis
that did not include adjustment for an IMD), affd, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989); cf In re
PNB Holding Co. S'holders Litig., 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 158, No. 28-N, at *114 (Aug.
18, 2006) (noting without citation that "an exit multiple based on minority trading
data from.., dubious comparable companies" is "a less favored technique that raises
questions about whether it embeds a minority discount"). It appears that Vice Chan-
cellor Strine, the author of the PNB Holding opinion, has recognized the inconsistency
we point out.
20 Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 2, at 164-65 (urging application of a more robust
conception of future cash flows as a check on controlling shareholder opportunism).
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abuse by controlling stockholders. The arsenal of corporate finance
techniques available to measure going concern value, correctly ap-
plied, would award shareholders the appropriate amount.
We reach this conclusion in the following steps. In Part I, we review
the fortuitous and haphazard means by which the IMD sprouted up in
Delaware valuation law. Part II outlines the finance principles that gen-
erally underlie Delaware valuation law, and Part III argues that while
such law is generally consistent with those finance principles in both
concept and application, the IMD is not. Finally, Part IV suggests how
the IMD can easily and fairly be excised from Delaware appraisal law,
and how alternative, financially supportable valuation methodology can
address controlling stockholder opportunism, as long as the Delaware
courts remain true-as we expect they would-to Weinberger's admoni-
tion to remain open to evidence from the financial community.
I. WHENCE IMD?
As previously noted, the focus of our inquiry is the Delaware
courts' recent assertion of the IMD-the proposition that share prices
in reasonably active markets systematically and substantially understate
the pro rata present value, net of debt, of the firm's free cash flows. In
this Part, we examine the background and relatively recent develop-
ment of that puzzling embrace.2 ' We turn first to a review of the
foundational antecedents of Delaware share valuation law. We next
review the Delaware courts' initial-and emphatically negative-
reaction to IMD-type adjustments. Thereafter, we review the critical
juncture-less than fifteen years ago-at which the Delaware courts
first adopted a share valuation premised upon the IMD adjustment.
Finally, we review how that initial acceptance rapidly evolved so that,
by 2004, it had become essentially a rule of law that requires no evi-
dentiary support and, therefore, is unconstrained by contrary evi-
dence of generally accepted financial practice.
21 Richard Booth has made a similar effort to trace the source of the IMD and
shares our disagreement with that aspect of Delaware appraisal law. Richard A. Booth,
Minority Discounts and Control Premiums in Appraisal Proceedings, 57 BUS. LAW. 127, 148-51
(2001). Carney and Heimendinger also criticize the IMD (noting that "unfortunately,
it is the current operative assumption of the Delaware courts") and suggest that the
IMD "is offered without any attempt at a theory," but they conclude that responding to
the IMD is therefore "impossible and probably not worthwhile." William J. Carney &
Mark Heimendinger, Appraising the Nonexistent: The Delaware Courts' Struggle with Control
Premiums, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 863 (2003).
20071
8 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREVIEW
A. The Doctrinal Soil of the IMD: The Backdrop
of Delaware Supreme Court Precedent
Delaware appraisal law has never been particularly friendly to the
idea that stock market prices always accurately represent a propor-
tional share of the value of the enterprise as a going concern. In Chi-
cago Corp. v. Munds, one of the earliest appraisal cases, decided in the
depths of the Great Depression, the Court of Chancery vividly out-
lined its distrust o; financial market prices as exclusive measures of
firm value:
When it is said that the appraisal which the market puts upon the value
of the stock of an active corporation as evidenced by its daily quotations,
is an accurate, fair reflection of its intrinsic value, no more than a mo-
ment's reflection is needed to refute it.... The experience of recent
years is enough to convince the most casual observer that the market in
its appraisal of values must have been woefully wrong in its estimates at
one time or another within the interval of a space of time so brief that
fundamental conditions could not possibly have become so altered as to
affect true worth.... The numerous causes that contribute to their
nervous leaps from dejected melancholy to exhilarated enthusiasm and
then back again from joy to grief, need not be reviewed.... Even when
conditions are normal and no economic forces are at work unduly to ex-
alt or depress the financial hopes of man, market quotations are not safe
22
to accept as unerring expressions of value.
There are two aspects of this superficially hostile view of the abili-
ties of financial markets, however, that suggest compatibility with
modern financial theory. First, the court merely rejects the use of
share market prices as the exclusive measure of "fair value"; it certainly
does not prohibit consideration of market prices in assessing fair
value. Second, and more importantly, the court's references to "ex-
treme moods" and "nervous leaps from dejected melancholy to ex-
hilarated enthusiasm" are quite consistent with more recent and
modest assertions about the force of the efficient capital markets hy-
pothesis.23 In particular, the court's understandably skeptical view of
contemporaneous share markets aligns with those who appreciate that
prices in reasonably efficient markets suffer from "noise" trading from
time to time. On the other hand-and this is a critical point-there is
22 Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 455 (Del. Ch. 1934).
23 See, e.g., Michael L. Wachter, Takeover Defense when Financial Markets Are (Only)
Relatively Efficient, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 787, 798-99 (2003) (discussing studies that indi-
cate that at least temporary mispricing occurs regularly even in well-developed securi-
ties markets); Fredrick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral
Finance, 31 DEL.J. CORP. L. 455 (2006) (same).
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nothing in Munds that begins to assert that market prices systemati-
cally err on the low side relative to firm value or, to use the court's
words, "inherent worth." 4  In short, Munds does not stand for the
proposition that publicly traded shares suffer from a persistent "de-
jected melancholy" or, in modern language, an inherent discount rela-
tive to firm value.
When the Delaware Supreme Court first addressed the appraisal
statute's concept of "fair value" in Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, its
holding was much more sympathetic to the efficiency theme in mod-
ern finance theory and the importance of share prices in establishing
"fair value." 25 In that case, the court addressed the valuation of shares
of a leveraged closed-end investment company (General Sharehold-
ings), in which the Tri-Continental Corporation held a controlling
ownership stake. The corporation's net asset value (NAV) signifi-
cantly exceeded (by around 25%) the aggregate market value of its
26outstanding shares. In this setting, the Supreme Court correctly ar-
ticulated the "proportionate interest in a going concern" as " [t] he ba-
sic concept of value under the appraisal statute" that has guided
27Delaware appraisal law ever since.
With that concept as a guide, one might have expected the Dela-
ware Supreme Court to uphold the lower court's insistence on giving
at least partial weight to an estimate of the firm's NAV free of any dis-
count associated with the trading price of the shares. In more recent
parlance, the court might have simply explained that the discount was
"at the shareholder level," and not "at the corporate level," and might
therefore have declined to give any valuation effect to the discount.
28
24 Munds, 172 A. at 455.
25 Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 75-76 (Del. 1950).
26 Id. at 73. Benjamin Graham, the well-known expert on security analysis, gave a
lecture in early 1947 in which he suggested that General Shareholdings (the firm that
merged into Tri-Continental the following year) was a bargain in the market, and that
the discount created an opportunity for "intelligent speculation." Benjamin Graham,
Lecture No. 10, in THE REDISCOVERED BENJAMIN GRAHAM: SELECTED WRITINGS OF A
WALL STREET LEGEND 151 Uanet Lowe ed. 1999), available at http://www.wiley.com/
legacy/products/subject/finance/bgraham/benlecl0.html. As suggested below, how-
ever, the market may have been wiser than Mr. Graham suggested. See infra note 154.
27 7i-Continental, 74 A.2d at 72.
28 Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989). Professor John
Coates explains at length and with considerable force why Ti-Continental and Cavalier are
essentially inconsistent, and why the "shareholder level" and "corporate level" discount
parlance is largely meaningless. SeeJohn C. Coates IV, "Fair Value"As an Avoidable Rule of
Corporate Law: Minority Discount s in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1251, 1272
(1999) (concluding that "if a 'no-discount' rule is to be taken seriously, then a stronger
2007]
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That was not the approach, however, that the Delaware Supreme
Court took. To the contrary, it restored the result reached by a court-
appointed appraiser, in which estimated NAV was reduced by the ob-
served 25% market price discount in order to arrive at "fair 
value."' '
The court explained that failing to give full effect to this discount
would be "fail [ing] to face the economic facts"-specifically, the facts
that "the only way in which a common stockholder of a going closed-
end company with leverage can obtain the value of his stock is by the
sale of it on the market," and that "whenever he seeks to do so, he, by
force of circumstances, must sell at a discount, whenever this is an op-
erating element.,
30
Superficially, then, the analysis in Tr-Continental is friendly to advo-
cates of share market prices as evidence of "fair value." On the other
hand, there is a not-so-subtle implication in the case that even in an ac-
tive market, shares trade at a substantial discount relative to the current
value of the firm. 31 As we will see, this implication-that net asset value
could be persistently above market value-may well have contributed to
the Delaware courts' eventual receptivity to the IMD concept. Indeed,
Tri-Continentals failure (understandable, to be sure) to appreciate and
comment on the unusual nature of closed-end funds may have made
the IMD concept easier to accept in the long run.
In hindsight, however, there are several ways in which the court in
Tri-Continental could have readily explained the observed discount
without implying that share market prices in general are inherently
discounted relative to firm value. First, the float of shares of General
Shareholdings was small, and the shares were not actively traded. 32 It
rationale is needed-one that focuses less on the 'level' at which discounts are imposed
and more on the working mechanics of the valuation methodologies employed and the
sources of discounts, particularly on the existence or absence of control").
29 Ti-Continental, 74 A.2d at 75.
30 Id. at 76.
31 The closed-end fund discount has been cited in support of challenges to the
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) See, e.g., WILLIAM W. BRATrON, CORPO-
RATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 157-58 (5th ed. 2003) (citing J. Bradford De
Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703, 728 (1990)).
For an explanation suggesting that the ECMH is consistent with observed closed-end
fund discounts, however, see infra Part II.F.2.
32 ARTHUR WIESENBERGER, INVESTMENT COMPANIES 152 (1948) ("The 1,602,466
shares outstanding [at December 31, 1947] (held by 2,937 stockholders) are relatively
inactive on the New York Curb Exchange. The floating supply is obviously small be-
cause Tri-Continental owns 60% ...."). Just 39,000 shares of General Shareholdings
were traded in 1947, the year before the merger that gave rise to the Ti-Continental
case. Id. at 153. In contrast, many other closed-end investment companies had much
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is now well established that such thin trading and relative lack of mar-
ketability will result in a trading price that may be discounted relative
to the value of the firm. Second, and as we discuss below, the dis-
count to some extent may simply have been a function of the market's
perception that the fund's management might extract compensation
or fail to manage the fund's assets effectively in the future. Finally,
although we do not associate this with a discount to "fair value," Gen-
35eral Shareholdings had a controlling shareholder, a circumstance
that some say results in trading at some discount relative to what the
shares would have traded at in the absence of a controlling share-
holder." As we observe below, however, that discount may not be a
more active trading in the same time frame. Id. at 119 (Adams Express Co., 232,000
shares), 129 (American Superpower Corp., 865,000 shares), 131 (Adlas Corp., 187,000
shares), 141 (Chicago Corp., 706,000 shares), 145 (Equity Corp., 413,000 shares), 169
(Pennroad Corp., 439,000 shares), 177 (Tri-Continental Corp., 647,000 shares), 179
(United Corp., 1,980,000 shares). These annual trading volume figures are dwarfed by
the levels reflected in today's equity markets, where the daily trading volume of the
New York Stock Exchange's most active stocks is typically in the tens of millions of
shares. See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Most Active, Gainers and Losers, Feb. 9, 2007, at C8 (report-
ing trading volumes from approximately 18.7 to 88 million shares for each of the
twenty-five most active issues). It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that most of the closed-
end fund shares reflected discounts relative to net asset value that were similar in scale
to the discount applicable to General Shareholdings. See WIESENBERGER, supra, at 94
(Pennroad/42%, Tri-Continental/38%, Adams Express/35%, Equity Corp./32%, At-
las/25%). Discussing the closed-end fund discount phenomenon, the source of these
statistics reports that such discounts "have shown a characteristic tendency to narrow in
rising markets and widen in declining markets," but also notes that "Lehman, a leader
in the non-leverage field, sold at small premiums in the final months of 1947 and its
closing price was the same as its asset value." Id.
33 See, e.g., PRATT ET AL., supra note 18, at 392 ("All other things being equal, an
ownership interest in a business is worth more if it is readily marketable."); Coates, su-
pra note 28, at 1262 n.35 (noting the existence of a "marketability discount").
34 See infra Part II.F.2 (discussing Jonathan Berk & Richard Stanton, A Rational
Model of the Closed-End Fund Discount (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 10412, Apr. 2004), available at http://nber.org/papers/w0412.
35 WIESENBERGER, supra note 32, at 152 ("Tri-Continental owns 60%, Selected In-
dustries 19% and Central States Electric about 6%" of General Shareholdings).
36 See Alexander Khutorsky, Note, Coming in from the Cold: Reforming Shareholders'
Appraisal Rights in Freeze-Out Transactions, 1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 133, 160 n.169
("The theoretical existence of a control premium suggests that [the] price of minority
shares held in a company controlled by a majority shareholder should be lower than
the price of shares held in the same company but with a more dispersed ownership
structure."); Coates, supra note 28, at 1278 ("Ceteris paribus, the presence of a control
person will reduce the value of publicly held minority shares ...."). Coates wisely cau-
tions, however, that in some instances "[t]he presence of a controlling shareholder
may improve managerial monitoring and thus reduce the expropriation value relative
to a firm without a controlling shareholder." Id. at 1278 n.87. Coates also cites em-
pirical evidence in support of his general assertion. Id. at 1280 n.93 (citing Roger C.
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discount relative to "fair value," but may simply reflect agency costs as-
sociated with the controlling shareholder that affect the value of the
firm and only indirectly affect the value of the shares. 7
In any event, the next major Delaware Supreme Court decision af-
fecting the discount issue did not come until thirty-five years after Tri-
Continental. In the meantime, in the rubric of the "earnings value"
component of the so-called "Delaware block method," the Delaware
courts repeatedly used a result derived from comparable company• 38
share prices with no adjustment for any discount at all. It was there-
fore notable when the Delaware Supreme Court announced in 1985
in Smith v. Van Gorkom-without citation and relying solely on the par-
ties' agreement-that a "publicly-traded stock price is solely a measure
of the value of a minority position and, thus, market price represents
only the value of a single share. ,3 9 The thrust of this observation was
that the directors could not legitimately rely exclusively on the fact
that the merger price exceeded the stock market price as a basis for
concluding that the corporation should enter into the merger agree-
ment at issue. 4°
Graham, Jr. & Craig E. Lefanowicz, Valuation of Companies for the Estate and Gift Tax:
Evidence of Minority Interest Discounts, 9 ADVANcEs TAX'N 77 (1997)).
37 See infra Part II.F.2. Of course, as discussed previously, we would agree that "fair
value" should not be burdened by agency costs that stem from demonstrable past or
anticipated breaches of fiduciary duty.
38 See, e.g., Associated Imports, Inc. v. ASG Indus., No. 5953, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS
483, *44 (June 20, 1984) ("As to an appropriate price/earnings rating, the leading
companies in the industry trade in a five to seven range. Given Fourco's modest share
of the market and its relatively brief period of success, I find that a multiple of five is
appropriate to capitalize annualized earnings."); Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344, 348 (Del. Ch. 1973) (selecting an earnings multiple
derived from "the average price earnings ratio of nine motion picture companies"),
affd, 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975); DavidJ. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d
427, 433-34 (Del. Ch. 1968) (referring to price earnings ratios for comparable compa-
nies); Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 159 A.2d 278, 285 (Del. Ch. 1960) (stating
that the multiple was "obtained by averaging the earnings-price ratios of representative
stocks for the five year period before the merger").
39 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985). To be fair, the opinion recites that "several of
the directors testified that, as a general rule, most chief executives think that the mar-
ket undervalues their companies' stock." Id. This recitation does not disclose, how-
ever, whether the subjectively perceived undervaluation was relative to the present
value of the future free cash flows of the firm, or simply what the firm could be sold for
as a whole to a third party. It has been suggested in any event that the directors'
judgment suffered from "cognitive bias [and therefore was] entitled to little or no cre-
dence." Carney & Heimendinger, supra note 21, at 854 n.48.
40 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875 (" [I]n the absence of other sound valuation infor-
mation, the fact of a premium alone does not provide an adequate basis upon which to
assess the fairness of an offering price.").
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We have no literal quarrel with the court's observation or its ensu-
ing legal conclusion. Undoubtedly, in many (if not most) cases, the
company can be sold to a third party at a price greater than its share
market price because share market transactions do not involve sales of
corporate control. Therefore, if a director's obligation is to achieve
the highest reasonably available value in a sale of the company, 4' it was
certainly appropriate for the court in Van Gorkom to insist that director
approval of a merger not rest entirely on the mere fact that the deal
price exceeds the current market price of the company's shares. Un-
fortunately, however, one could also take Van Gorkom's admonition
that the "publicly-traded stock price is solely the value of a minority
position" as a sweeping suggestion that all publicly traded shares suf-
fer from a "minority" discount;42 as we will soon see, that is exactly
what the courts said when they subsequently began to embrace the
IMD. Nevertheless, even after Van Gorkom it still could be maintained
that no Delaware court had squarely adopted the proposition that
share prices in active markets inherently understate firm value.
Four years after Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court decided
Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett,43 perhaps the leading Delaware case on
the subject of determining "fair value." And like Van Gorkom, Cavalier
did not squarely embrace the IMD. To the contrary, its principal rele-
vant holding was simply that the "application of a discount to a minor-
ity shareholder is contrary to the requirement that the company be
viewed as a 'going concern.' The valuation to which the "minority
41 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (holding that when a company's sale is inevitable, the directors' obligation is to
sell to the highest bidder).
42 Indeed, Van Gorkom's terse remand instruction (directing an award of damages
"to the extent that the fair value of Trans Union exceeds $55 per share [the market
price]," Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893) only reinforces the notion that "fair value" gen-
erally exceeds share price. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van
Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477, 483, 488-89 (2000) (suggesting that this damages formula
relying on "fair value" does not accord with Revlon's subsequently expressed require-
ment of achieving the highest currently available third-party sale value-a value that,
unlike "fair value," may include synergies arising from the combination).
43 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
44 Id. at 1145. The court also stated that "to fail to accord to a minority shareholder
the full proportionate value of his shares imposes a penalty for lack of control, and un-
fairly enriches the majority shareholders." Id. (emphasis added). To the extent, there-
fore, that Cavalier expresses concern about a "penalty for lack of control," it does so
only in the limited context where "majority shareholders" are squeezing out a "minor-
ity shareholder," and it does not hold that share market prices always penalize a non-
controlling holder.
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discount" was unsuccessfully sought to be applied was a DCF analysis. 5
As we explain below, any such application of a "minority discount"
would be double-counting if the DCF analysis already accurately nets
out the firm's agency costs associated with the presence of a control-
ling shareholder.46 We therefore fully concur with the holding in
Cavalier that "fair value" determined on a DCF basis should not be
burdened by an additional discount that would reflect the fact that
shares being appraised are shares of a company with a controlling
stockholder. In any event, nothing in Cavalier stands for the proposi-
tion that all publicly traded shares are "minority" shares, or that all
share prices are therefore subject to a "minority discount."
The first direct attempt to persuade the Delaware courts to accept
the IMD emerged in the Court of Chancery in the 1991 case of In re Ra-
diology Associates. We defer attention to that important case, however,
until after we review the one other principal background decision of
the Delaware Supreme Court: its 1992 opinion in Rapid-American Corp.
48v. Harris. We consider the Rapid opinion to be controversial, to say
the least. Its core relevant holding was that in determining the "fair
value" of shares of a conglomerate with wholly-owned subsidiaries,
"Delaware law compels the inclusion of a control premium" associated
with ownership of those subsidiaries. 4) The trial court's failure to in-
clude such a control premium, the court explained, "artificially and un-
realistically treated Rapid as a minority shareholder. " 50
It takes little imagination to see that this rationale, carried to its
logical conclusion, compels the inclusion of a control premium,
45 Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, Nos. 7959, 1988 WL 15816, at *22-23 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 2, 1988), affd, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
46 See infra Part II.C.
47 611 A.2d 485 (Del. Ch. 1991).
48 603 A.2d 796 (Del. 1992).
49 Id. at 806 (emphasis omitted); see also M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d
513, 524 (Del. 1999) ("[I]n valuing a holding company in a statutory appraisal pro-
ceeding, pursuant to Section 262, it is appropriate to include a control premium for
majority ownership of a subsidiary as an element of the holding company's fair value of
the majority-owned subsidiaries."). The trial court in Rapid addressed a valuation in
which Rapid's operating subsidiaries were appraised using a comparable company
analysis based on share market multiples, and insisted upon the addition of a "control
premium" that was derived from observed premiums in acquisitions of companies
comparable to Rapid's subsidiaries. Harris v. Rapid-Am. Corp., No. 6462, 1990 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 166, at *36 (Oct. 2, 1990), affd in part and rev'd in part, 603 A.2d 796 (Del.
1992) (" [P] etitioners arrived at a control premium of 45% after looking at control pre-
miums paid for companies during 1980.").
50 Rapid, 603 A.2d at 806.
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measured by a hypothetical third-party sale value, in all share valua-
tion cases, notjust in situations in which the corporation owns its op-
erating assets through controlled subsidiaries. A corporation's control
of directly owned assets is at least as great as it would be if those assets
were held through controlled subsidiaries. If the going concern itself
must be valued on the basis of the hypothetical third-party sale value
of its controlled subsidiaries, it is therefore hard to see why it should
not also be valued on the basis of the hypothetical third-party sale
value of its directly owned operating assets as well. To fail to do so
would, to paraphrase Rapid, artificially and unrealistically treat the
corporation as the minority owner of its operating assets. Of course,
we do not advocate this approach, which we believe is contrary to
other Delaware case law, both recent and longstanding."
We are much more inclined to view Rapid as a results-driven rul-
ing, aimed at checking an opportunistic acquisition of control by fin-
ancier Meshulam Riklis. The merger was the culmination of a scheme
by Riklis to acquire 100% ownership of Rapid, without paying a con-
trol premium, through open market purchases and through his sub-
sequent use, as CEO and Chairman, of corporate assets to repurchase
shares and thereby increase his ownership to 46.5% of Rapid's out-
52standing shares. If the Delaware courts continue to hold, as we
agree they should, that "fair value" is not to be determined by refer-
ence to the hypothetical third-party sale value of the firm, they would
promote doctrinal integrity by limiting Rapid to its facts and com-
pletely rejecting a generalized application of its literal holding.
53
Of greater present relevance, in any event, is the question of what
Rapid does not say about the IMD. In that case, the Delaware Supreme
Court insisted that controlled subsidiaries be valued on a basis that in-
cluded a control premium.'4 Naturally, then, the court declined to
accept, without upward adjustment, a methodology for valuing the
subsidiaries that was based on share market prices that did not include
a control premium. And given the court's insistence on applying a
5 See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 2, at 152 n.128 (citing Delaware cases
rejecting valuation based on hypothetical third-party sale value).
52 Rapid, 603 A.2d at 799-800.
53 At least one attempt to limit Rapid to its facts failed, however. See Le Beau v.
M.G. Bancorp., Inc., No. 13413, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *38-39 (Jan. 29, 1998) (re-
jecting the argument that Rapid's addition of a control premium was limited to situa-
tions involving subsidiaries in different lines of business), affd in part, 737 A.2d 513
(Del. 1999).
54 Rapid, 603 A.2d at 806.
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control premium measured by hypothetical third-party sale value, we
would agree that share market prices of comparable companies, which
do not generally reflect such hypothetical sale value, cannot be used
for the purpose demanded by the court. Once again, however, the
court in Rapid did not hold that the comparable companies' share
market prices were discounted relative to the firms' "going concern
value." Rather, on our literal reading of Rapid, the Supreme Court
was merely insisting, correctly, that such prices did not reflect the
putatively required element of a control premium. Thus, at least
through 1992, not a single Delaware case had held that share prices in
active markets necessarily understate "going concern value."
B. The Initial Appearance (and Rejection) of the IMD
The term "implicit minority discount" surfaced for the first time in
the Delaware case law in In re Radiology Associates, a 1991 case in which
shares of a closely held medical services provider were appraised for
purposes of assessing the fairness of a squeeze-out merger. '5 Having
rejected the comparable company/market multiple analysis presented
by the plaintiff's expert witness (Anne Danyluk-a name that will re-
turn later in this story), the court relied on her valuation based on a
DCF analysis. The plaintiffs expert, however, contended that her
DCF result was understated because it "include [d] an implicit minor-
ity discount." 57 More specifically, she claimed that she had derived a
discount rate from rates of return demanded on a "minority interest,"
and that the DCF analysis therefore "fail[ed] to value fully the com-
pany as a whole with a premium over market price.,, 58 Accordingly,
she applied a 30% increment to her DCF result "to represent a fair es-
timate for premiums over market price. ' ' 9
The Court of Chancery readily rejected the plaintiffs expert's ad-
justment, agreeing with the defendants' argument that the adjustment
was inappropriate "no matter if the plaintiff labels the 30% as a pre-
mium or recompense for a discount. ", ° Acknowledging that the DCF
55 611 A.2d 485, 487-88, 494 (Del. Ch. 1991).
56 Id. at 498.
57 Id. at 494.
58 Id. Presumably, a "minority" share requires a higher return and, therefore, im-
plies a higher cost of equity and, accordingly, a higher discount rate, thus tending to
reduce the valuation derived from the DCF approach.
59 Id.
60°Id.
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approach "may have left out a premium that normally accrues when
shareholders sell a company," the court concluded that the
"[p]laintiff was not entitled to the proportionate sales value of Radiol-
ogy.... [and t]he discounted cash flow analysis.., fully reflects this
value without need for an adjustment.",
6
1
The IMD fared no better in its next outing in the Delaware courts.
In Salomon Bros. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., the petitioner's expert
added a 15% upward adjustment to the result of a comparable com-
pany market multiple analysis, "to compensate for what he called an
'implicit minority discount.' 62 The defendant's expert, however, tes-
tified that he had "never heard of the expression 'implicit minority
discount,"' and disputed the "premise that market value is inevitably
less than intrinsic value."63 According to the Vice Chancellor, the pe-
titioner's expert had failed to demonstrate why his 15% adjustment
"yielded a fair value for the entire company on a going concern basis
rather than a premium value, as is often offered in an acquisition.
Simply deciding that "15% was a reasonable figure" was not, according
to the Vice Chancellor, a "level of analysis ... sufficiently reliable to
form the basis of a decision on fair value."6
If the Delaware courts' treatment of the IMD had ended here, this
Article would have never been written. As we will see momentarily,
however, the IMD was introduced into Delaware jurisprudence in
separate cases in 1992 and 1995, and in neither case was its existence
contested by an expert witness. In the next two Sections we trace the
progress of the IMD in those cases and its subsequent evolution into a
legal rule.
C. The IMD Takes Root
In late 1992, the same Vice Chancellor who had rejected the IMD
in the Salomon Bros. case earlier in the year approved a valuation using
the IMD. What could possibly have accounted for this change of posi-
tion? As it turns out, the answer is not revised thinking, but simply for-
61 Id.
62 No. 10,054, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 100, at *14 (May 1, 1992). Professor Hamer-
mesh represented the petitioner in this litigation, and enjoys the dubious privilege of
criticizing the argument he made in that case. The fact that the argument was unsuc-
cessful, at least in that case, is of some comfort.
63 Id. at *15.
64 Id. at "16-17.
65 Id. at *17.
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tuitous accident. In Hodas v. Spectrum Technology, Inc., Anne Danyluk-
the same person who had served as the expert for the plaintiff in Radiol-
ogy--served as the valuation expert for the respondent. 66 Perhaps to
avoid a charge of opportunistic inconsistency, Danyluk, despite acting
on the side advocating the lower valuation, added a 30% premium to
the result she derived from analyzing share market multiples of EB-
DIT,67 similar to what she had done (unsuccessfully) in Radiology. Once
again, she explained this choice as necessary "to adjust for the fact that
the EBDIT multiple reflects a stock price for a single share on a public
stock exchange and, thus, includes a minority discount.",6
In proffering the upward IMD adjustment on behalf of the re-
spondents, however, Danyluk of course met no opposition from the
petitioner, and the court did not reject the adjustment sua sponte. To
the contrary, the adjustment was incorporated in the final valuation
result without comment or evaluation by the Vice Chancellor. 9 Thus,
the IMD was first planted in Delaware valuation doctrine not by adver-
sarial process and judicial evaluation, but by default.
The next sprouting of the IMD in Delaware law occurred three
years later, just as it did in Hodas, in a case where none of the valua-
tion experts contested the existence of an IMD in public market share
prices. In Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., the court heard from
three valuation experts: one presented by the petitioners, one pre-
sented by the respondent, and a neutral expert retained by the
court.'0 The petitioner's expert added an 86% premium to the result
he reached using a comparable company share market multiple analy-
sis.7 ' At trial, the respondent's expert testified that "'the preponder-
ance of opinion is that there is some minority interest that's implicit
66 No. 11,265, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 252, at *4 (Dec. 7, 1992). Once again, it must
be noted that Professor Hamermesh acted as counsel for the petitioner in this case. In
this case, the petitioner did not so much advocate the IMD as omit, in his self-interest,
to oppose the respondent's expert's use of it.67 ..Earnings before depreciation, interest, and taxes.
M Id. at *5. On the other hand, Danyluk also applied a 40% discount for lack of
marketability, a discount that the Vice Chancellor rejected as inconsistent with Dela-
ware law. Id. at *6, *14-15.
69 Id. at *10.
70 No. 1107, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *2-3 (June 15, 1995). The use of a court-
appointed expert, while a well-known possibility, has been an unusual step in Delaware
appraisal proceedings, suggesting that the courts have not found it to be of substantial
assistance. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 758 A.2d 485, 496-97 (Del. 2000) (reject-
ing trial court appointment of valuation expert to conduct "quasi-judicial functions").
7 Kleinwort, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *6.
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in a publicly traded company's price."- 72 The court-appointed expert
also asserted that some premium was "necessary to remove the minor-
ity discount inherent in publicly traded stock .... Thus, while re-
spondent's counsel had instructed its expert that application of a
premium to compensate for IMD was contrary to Delaware law, 74 no
expert testified unequivocally against the existence of an IMD. The
court therefore had no choice, "[u]pon the record presented," but to
"conclude that both experts should have adjusted market value to
compensate for an inherent minority discount."'" Acknowledging that
this conclusion squarely contradicted the 1992 ruling in Salomon Bros.,
the Chancellor simply chalked up the difference to the fact that the
records in the two cases were different, and that the record in the case
at hand-including undisputed testimony that the IMD existed-
compelled a finding "that the market price for publicly traded stock
includes a minority discount."'
76
That left the Chancellor to determine the magnitude of the ad-
justment required by the IMD. Petitioner's expert had pegged it at
86%, an amount derived more or less from observed control premi-
ums paid in recent mergers. 7 The Chancellor rejected that number,
however, as impermissibly including "value arising from synergies or
new management plans," and ruled that the adjustment based on con-
trol premium data should have been reduced "so that it reflected just
the minority discount., 78 The respondent's expert, despite having
been instructed by the respondent that the IMD was improper as a
matter of law, allowed at trial that "a reasonable estimate of the minor-
ity discount is around 10-15%." 7  And the court-appointed expert
concluded that "setting an exact figure for the minority discount
comes down to an arbitrary determination. " 8 Rather than take the
approach adopted in Salomon Bros., however, where the Vice Chancel-
lor found a conclusory estimate to be insufficiently reliable as a basis
72 Id. at *8.
73 Id. at*11-12.
74 Id. at*12.
75 Id. at *8.
76 Id. at *8-9.
77 Id. at *10-1 1.
78 Id. at*]1.
79 Id. at *12. The opinion does not recite any analysis or empirical support under-
lying this estimate.
80 Id.
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for an upward IMD adjustment,8' the Chancellor in Kleinwort con-
cluded that choosing a zero adjustment was "more arbitrary than en-
deavoring to find its true value, ' 2 and simply chose the midpoint
(12.5%) of the range proffered in conclusory fashion by the respon-
83dent's expert.
Therefore, as matters stood after Kleinwort the IMD had not yet
taken root as a legally mandated principle; it was simply a matter to be
determined on the strength of the expert testimony in the case. It was
at least theoretically possible for a respondent-engaged valuation ex-
pert to assert that the IMD did not truly exist as a general proposition,
and for a court to accept that testimony if it was better substantiated
than any contrary testimony from the petitioner. For better or worse,
however, the Delaware courts' next encounter with the IMD occurred
in a case in which the respondents' expert had coauthored a book
stating that the "comparative publicly traded company valuation tech-
nique produce [s] a minority discounted valuation" 84 -a proposition
that the courts viewed as supporting the existence of an IMD.
8
s
5
D. The IMD Goes from Permissible to Mandatory
In Le Beau v. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc., the respondents' expert ana-
lyzed the value of the company's two subsidiaries on the basis of compa-
rable company share market multiples. 86 The petitioners attacked that
analysis as improper because "it include[d] a built-in minority dis-
count. " 87 The Vice Chancellor concurred, because "[t] he valuation lit-
erature, including a treatise coauthored by [the respondents' expert]
himself, supports that position, and Respondents have introduced no
evidence to the contrary."88 On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court
81 Salomon Bros. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., No. 10,054, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS
100, at *17 (May 1, 1992).
82 Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., No. 1107, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *12
(June 15, 1995).
83 Id.
84 M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. LeBeau, 737 A.2d 513, 522 n.26 (Del. 1999) (referring to
S.P. PRATr ET AL., VALUINGA BUSINESS 194-95, 210 (3d ed. 1996)).
85 We explain below that this reading of Pratt is flawed, and that the so-called "mi-
nority" valuation approach described by Pratt et al. includes the kind of DCF analysis
that the Delaware courts routinely and appropriately accept as a basis for determining
"fair value." See infra Part III.B.
86 No. 13414, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *11 (Jan. 29, 1998), afftd, 737 A.2d 513
(Del. 1999).
87 Id. at *25.
88 Id. The only pieces of "valuation literature" cited by the court were the Pratt
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affirmed this ruling, finding that the Vice Chancellor's conclusions
were "fully supported by the record evidence that was before the Court
of Chancery and [by] the prior holdings of this Court construing Sec-
tion 262." s9 In short, in a case where one expert declined to use an
IMD adjustment to a comparable company share market multiple
analysis, his view was rejected because of outside "literature" (including
in particular a book that he had coauthored) and because of "prior
holdings" of the Delaware Supreme Court. Thus, the courts' accep-
tance of the IMD was no longer purely an evaluation of expert testi-
mony in the record; now, just seven years since the IMD was rejected in
the Delaware courts, outside "literature" and prior judicial acceptance
took on the imprimatur of authority for use of the IMD.
After Le Beau, the IMD's momentum accelerated, with several
Delaware valuation decisions routinely finding the existence of an
IMD and applying an upward adjustment to a comparable company
share market multiple valuation approach. 9° This occurred when re-
spondents failed to offer contrary expert testimony, or to contest the
existence of an IMD at all. 9' In one of those cases, Agranoff v. Miller,
treatise and Z. CHRISTOPHER MERCER, VALUING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 198-200, 207-
41 (1992). As explained below, neither of these authorities, properly understood, as-
serts the existence of an IMD. See infra Part III.B.
89 M.G. Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 523. Citing its earlier opinion in Rapid, the Supreme
Court similarly upheld the Vice Chancellor's acceptance of an analysis of the subsidiar-
ies' value that was based on premiums paid in acquisitions of comparable companies.
Id. at 525.
90 See, e.g., Borruso v. Commc'ns Telesys. Int'l, 753 A.2d 451, 458 (Del. Ch. 1999)
("[T]he comparable company method of analysis produces an equity valuation that
inherently reflects a minority discount, as the data used for purposes of comparison is
all derived from minority trading values of the comparable companies. Because that
value is not fully reflective of the intrinsic worth of the corporation on a going concern
basis, this court has applied an explicit control premium in calculating the fair value of
the equity in an appraisal proceeding. It would seem to me to be particularly appro-
priate to do so where, as is true here, the comparable company method is the only
method available to me to value the shares in question." (citation omitted)); Bomarko,
Inc. v. Int'l Telecharge, Inc., 794 A.2d 1161, 1185 (Del. Ch. 1999) (accepting a compa-
rable company analysis to which a 30% premium had been applied in order "to ac-
count for the minority discount inherent in the comparable companies analysis");
Agranoffv. Miller, 791 A.2d 880, 892-93, 897 (Del. Ch. 2001) ("The comparable com-
panies analysis generates an equity value that includes an inherent minority trading
discount, because the method depends on comparisons to market multiples derived
from trading information for minority blocks of the comparable companies.").
9, In Bonmiso, the court recites that "[t]here is no dispute between [the parties]
that the comparable company method produces a minority valuation of the shares sub-
ject to appraisal, as has been recognized in decisions of this court." 753 A.2d at 457.
In Bomarko, the defendants did "not dispute that the value derived by comparable com-
panies method of analysis reflects an imbedded minority discount." 794 A.2d at 1186.
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the Vice Chancellor described the IMD adjustment-then less than
ten years old-as "a rigid, formulaic correction," and declined to ap-
ply it in his preferred valuation approach under the unusual circum-
stances of the case.92 Nevertheless, the Vice Chancellor indicated that
had he been bound to apply the "fair value" standard developed in
statutory appraisal proceedings, the result would have given effect to
an upward IMD adjustment.
93
By 2004, in any event, it became clear that Delaware's IMD doc-
trine no longer depended upon expert testimony, and that it had be-
come established as an element of valuation law. Doft & Co. v. Trave-
locity.com Inc.4 represents the culmination of this doctrinal develop-
ment. The experts in that case both had formidable credentials.9 5
Both experts developed a comparable company share market multiple
valuation. 96 Neither expert, however, urged that the result should be
augmented to eliminate a putative IMD; as the Vice Chancellor ex-
plained, "[tihe parties are silent on the proper application of a con-
trol premium."97 At this point, however, the absence of expert testi-
mony no longer mattered; according to the court, "Delaware law
recognizes that there is an inherent minority trading discount in a
comparable company analysis ... [and] the court, in appraising the
fair value of the equity, 'must correct this minority trading discount by
adding back a premium designed to correct it.' gs The expert wit-
In Agranoff the expert witness for the party arguing for a low "fair value" appears to
have challenged only the size of the IMD adjustment, and not the proposition that
such an adjustment was appropriate. 791 A.2d at 899-900.
92 791 A.2d at 893.
93 That IMD adjustment was calculated by means of what the Vice Chancellor can-
didly described as "a necessarily rough approach that simply involves shaving some
percentage off the top of the available information about control premiums paid." Id.
at 899.
94 No. 19734, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75 (May 21, 2004).
95 The petitioners' expert was William H. Purcell, an investment banker with over
thirty-five years of experience in significant mergers and acquisitions. Id. at *14. The
respondent presented the testimony of Professor Paul A. Gompers of the Harvard Busi-
ness School. Id. at *15. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., which had counseled the special
board committee involved in the transaction, was also a source of valuation expertise.
Id. at *12.
96 Id. at *32.
97 Id. at *46.
98 Id. (citing Agranoffv. Miller, 791 A.2d 880, 892 (Del. Ch. 2001)). In 2003, how-
ever, the same Vice Chancellor relied in part on a comparable companies market mul-
tiple analysis but declined to impose an upward IMD adjustment, noting that "[t]he
petitioner's expert made no such adjustment because he assumed it would be roughly
offset by a marketability discount related to [the firm's] status as a privately held com-
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nesses offered essentially no support for this view. To his considerable
credit, the petitioners' expert testified simply that "if the court is to
accept the theory that 'some minority discount from going concern
value' is appropriate in a comparable company analysis, then the cor-
rect valuation would be above his stated value.") Thus, left with no
expert testimony about the magnitude of the now legally required ad-
justment, the Vice Chancellor set the IMD adjustment at 30%, relying
exclusively on "recent appraisal cases that correct the valuation for a
minority discount by adding back a premium."
°°
So matters stood as of 2004. Both in existence and scale, the IMD
had been established as a matter of Delaware law, and it has continued
to be used to support an upward adjustment to valuations derived from
share market multiples observed in comparable publicly traded compa-
nies. 0 ' At the same time, the Delaware courts continue to resist (ap-
propriately, we believe) the application of a similar upward adjustment
to discounted cash flow valuations. 0 2  Indeed-and in a striking in-
pany." Taylor v. Am. Specialty Retailing Group, Inc., No. 19239, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS
75, at *23 n.24 (July 25, 2003).
99 Travelocity.com, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *46.
1oo Id. at *46-47 (citing Agranoff 791 A.2d at 887; Bomarko v. Int'l Telecharge, Inc.,
794 A.2d 1161, 1186 n.ll (Del. Ch. 1999), affd, 766 A.2d 437 (Del. 2000); Borruso v.
Commc'ns Telesys. Int'l, 753 A.2d 451,459 (Del. Ch. 1999)).
101 See, e.g., Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., Nos. 20336, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS
125, at *65, *70-71 (Aug. 19, 2005) (applying a 30% upward adjustment in order "[t]o
honor the Supreme Court's teaching that plaintiffs should receive their pro rata share
of the entity as a going concern, this court's decisions adjust minority trading multiples
to account for the implied discount, in order to accurately arrive at a fair value of the
entire entity"); Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., No. 19211, 2004 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 139, at *65-66 (Oct. 4, 2004) (accepting a comparable company valuation to
which a "control premium" had been added), afj'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
880 A.2d 206 (Del. 2005); Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., No. 12207,
2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 108 at *129-30 (July 30, 2004) ("Comparable company analy-
sis.., suffers from an inherent minority discount... [and] a "premium must be
added to adjust for the minority discount."). Interestingly, in Andaloro the court
thought it would be "appropriate" to reduce the 38% adjustment proffered by defen-
dants' expert witness to 30% because the 38% figure "did not seek to exclude any por-
tion of the average premia... to account for the sharing of synergies by the buyer with
the seller." 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, at *69, *70 n.74. Also, the Vice Chancellor did
acknowledge that "[t]here is some academic dispute about whether all companies'
shares trade at a discounted level." Id. at *65 n.69.
10,2 Dobler, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139, at *72 ("A DCF is a final valuation that does
not need any additional correction, such as a control premium."); Lane, 2004 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 108, at *117-18 & nn.159-60 (citing In re Radiology Assocs. Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d
485, 491 (Del. Ch. 1991) and SHANNON PRAIr, BUSINESS VALUATION DIScOUNTS AND
PREMIUMs 30 (2001)) ("The streams of income here do not require any adjustment for
an impermissible minority discount."). According to Pratt, "There is little or no differ-
ence in the rate of return that most investors require for investing in a public, freely
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stance of internal inconsistency-the Delaware courts have accepted
DCF valuations based on terminal values estimated using an exit multi-
ple approach, without making any IMD-type upward adjustment to the
terminal value. 10 An IMD adjustment to DCF valuation analysis re-
mains today, then, where such an adjustment to comparable company
market multiple analysis stood in 1992. While the courts remain open
to the "intellectually interesting argument in support of the proposition
that the DCF analysis necessarily introduces something of a minority
discount," they have not yet accepted it as a matter of law and continue
to reject it in the absence of persuasive evidence. 10
II. THE FINANCE BEHIND DELAWARE APPRAISAL LAW
Having shown how the IMD was planted and then nurtured in
case law, it is time to turn back to examining whether finance theory
and empirical evidence support the IMD. We argue that they do not.
Before reviewing how the Delaware courts might have come to a con-
trary view, however, we need to examine five core finance concepts:
going concern value; third-party sale value and synergies; the inci-
dence of agency costs; the nature of the benefits of control; and mar-
ket discounts. We discuss each of these in turn.
A. The Value of the Firm
The first concept is the value of the firm as that term is understood
in corporate finance. In valuing a company it is generally accepted that
discounting the firm's free cash flows provides the best measure of
tradable minority interest versus a controlling interest." PRATT, supra, at 30.
103 E.g., In re U.S. Cellular Operating Co., No. 18696, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1, at
*67 Uan. 6, 2005) (selecting "a terminal value multiple of 10 times EBITDA"); Gray v.
Cytokine Pharmascis., Inc., No. 17451, 2002 WL 853549, at *11 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25,
2002) ("[A] revenue multiple of 4.Ox should be applied to PSI's projected revenues in
2008 to determine most accurately the Company's terminal value."); Neal v. Ala. By-
Products Corp., No. 8282, 1990 WL 109243, at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990) (setting the
terminal value to be "equal to a price earnings multiple of 14 times annual earn-
ings ... plus a premium for 100% ownership"), affd, 588 A.2d 255 (Del. 1991); Cava-
lier Oil Co. v. Harnett, 1988 WL 15816, at *21 (Del. Ch. 1988) (multiplying the com-
pany's average yearly earnings plus the actual earnings in the year before merger by 12
to determine the terminal value), affd, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1988). In fairness, it
should be pointed out that Vice Chancellor Strine anticipated this inconsistency. See
In re PNB Holding Co. S'holders Litig., No. 28-N, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 158, at *114-15
(Aug. 18, 2006) (characterizing the exit multiple approach as "a less favored technique
that raises questions about whether it embeds a minority discount").
104 Lane, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 108, at *118 n.160.
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value. More specifically, for a firm with both debt and equity, the ac-
cumulated future cash flows to all claim holders in the firm are dis-
counted using the weighted average cost of capital.'05 Using the cost of
capital approach, the enterprise value of the firm is thus the following:
VF FCFF + FCFF + FCFFH
(I+WACC) (I+WACC) (I+ WACC)
H '
where V is the value of the firm financed using both debt and equity,
FCFF, is the free cash flow in year t, WACC is the weighted average cost
of capital, and H is equal to infinity.'0 6 In the appraisal setting, the
court's function is to value the equity of the firm. This can be done by
calculating VF and subtracting the value of the debt.
Since appraisal is about valuing equity, and since the focus of this
Article is to analyze the IMD, the exposition is simplified by assuming
that the above steps have been accomplished, and that we are then left
with the value of the equity (V). An even more important simplifying
assumption is to assume hereafter that the firm being appraised is fi-
nanced entirely with equity. In this case V,. = V.
1
0
7
For the all-equity firm, its value is the discounted value of the free
cash flows that the corporation's assets will produce over the indefi-
nite life of the corporation. Both Delaware appraisal law and finance
textbooks typically divide the calculation of V, into three steps. 108 The
first step is to determine the annual free cash flows (FCFs) over a ho-
rizon period (H), for which forecasts are available. The second is to
determine a terminal value (PH) representing the value of the free
cash flows beginning with the first year after which annual forecasts
are available. Finally, since future FCFs and the terminal value have to
be discounted to their present value, the court must determine the
company's cost of equity capital (r,):
FCF FCF FCF P
VE (+r) (l+rE) 2 +''.(l+rE)H + H (2)0  0 +rE) 0 + E (1 + rE ) H
105 ASWATH DAMODARAN, DAMODARAN ON VALUATION 193 (2d ed. 2006).
106 Id. at 31.
107 There are many interesting problems involved in the determination of the cost
of capital, but these are beyond the scope of this Article.
108 See, e.g., Henke v. Trilithic Inc., No. 13155, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170,
at *20 (Oct. 28, 2005); ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 917 (Del. Ch. 1999);
RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 508-12 (8th ed. 2006).
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The starting point for FCF estimates is incumbent management's
estimates for the forecast period.' °9 In the adversarial setting of an
appraisal, these forecasts will be challenged by the petitioners. Since
the petitioners believe that the fair value of the corporation is higher
than the price offered by the respondent, they will offer their own
evidence that FCFs within the forecast period are higher, the terminal
value is higher, and/or the discount rate is lower."0
In most cases, a great deal of the value of the company is captured
by the terminal value. The terminal value is calculated using one of
two approaches. First, using the Gordon growth model, Equation (2)
can be rewritten in the following form:"'
_ FCF + FCF + FCFn + FCF+× 1 (3)E(l+r,) (l+r,)' (I+ r,)H (r,-g) X(l+r,)H'
where g is an estimate of the firm's future growth rate, and (r-g)
is PH, the nondiscounted terminal value.
The second method used by the appraisal court and by finance
experts in calculating the terminal value is the comparable compan
method. This is implemented by recognizing that PH from Equation
(2) can also be estimated using financial market multiples, or "exit
multiples,"" 2 where PH is represented by
P, = FCF, x market multiple for FCF. (4)
Therefore, we have:
-FCF FCF2  FCFH  FCFH+
+------+...- -H +-- x marketmultipleforFCF. (5)
(I+rE) (l+rE)
2  (l+re)H (1+rE)H
The market multiple is the average multiple that the financial
markets assign to the comparable companies. For example, suppose
109 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor Inc., No. 7129, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 146, at
*25 (Dec. 31, 2003) (quoting Agranoff v. Miller, 791 A.2d 880, 892 (Del. Ch. 2001)),
affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 875 A.2d 602 (Del. 2005).
10 Sometimes the respondents in valuation proceedings, seeking a lower result,
challenge the application of what they consider to be inapplicable or unduly optimistic
forecasts. E.g., Prescott Group Small Cap, L.P. v. Coleman Co., No. 17802, 2004 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 131, at *22-39 (Sept. 8, 2004).
III DAMODARAN, supra note 105, at 158.
112 The Delaware courts regularly describe this method of estimating terminal
value as the "exit multiple" approach. E.g., Gholl v. eMachines, Inc., No. 19444, 2004
Del. Ch. LEXIS 171, at *50 (Nov. 24, 2004).
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comparable companies trade at an FCF multiple of 8. A company that
has an FCF of, say, $5 a share will be assigned a terminal value of $40 a
share. Numerous market multiples can be used and are used instead
of an FCF multiple. Other market multiples include the ratio of stock
price to earnings (P/E ratio), stock price to book value, and stock
price to EBDIT. The choice of the multiple depends on what data are
most reliable.
Equations (3) and (5) are mathematically equivalent, and the
courts refer to the valuation technique using either of these equations
as the income approach, or DCF approach." 3 We agree, but we also
note that Equation (5) uses a comparable company method in deter-
mining the terminal value. The choice between the two methods to
estimate terminal value depends on data reliability and availability.
When data are available for both methods, Equation (3) is the pre-
ferred method since it depends entirely on company-specific data."4
In appraisal cases, however, in which relevant company-specific data
may be either unavailable or unverifiable, the virtue of using Equation
(5) is that its use of comparable company analysis to estimate terminal
value bypasses the need to have an estimate for the company-specific
future growth rate g." The downside of using the comparable com-
pany analysis, on the other hand, is that its accuracy depends on the
availability of comparable companies' data.
The Delaware courts typically refer to the appraisal as relying on a
comparable company analysis only when comparable company data
are used without a near-term forecast period.'" This approach looks
113 See, e.g., id. at *26, *50 n.87 (describing a DCF analysis and noting the use in
such analysis of both approaches to estimating terminal value). The expert may esti-
mate g and r in Equation (2) using average rates for comparable companies, either to
justify her estimate of V or to provide a range.
114 Damodaran states that the relative valuation method, which relies on a compara-
ble company analysis, is inferior to the use of what we call the pure DCF method because
of the difficulties in determining comparables. DAMODARAN, supra note 105, at 231.
115 Future growth is notoriously difficult to forecast. In particular, to forecast g,
the expert needs to estimate the company's future marginal return on equity, which
can be highly problematic.
116 See, e.g., Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, No. 20336, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, at
*64 (Aug. 19, 2005) ("The comparable companies method of valuing the company's
equity involves several steps including: finding comparable, publicly-traded companies
that have reviewable financial information; calculating the ratio between the trading
price of the stocks of each of those companies and some recognized measure reflect-
ing their income such as revenue, EBIT or EBITDA; correcting these derived ratios to
account for differences, such as capital structure, between the public companies and
the target company being valued; and finally applying the average multiple to the rele-
vant income measurement of the target company, here PFPC. The methodology rests
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just like the approach to estimating terminal value in the DCF method
(see Equation (4)), except that in the expression PH, H = 1. In other
words, if FCF is the operative performance criterion to which compa-
rable company trading multiples will be applied, the near-term is only
one year and the terminal value (now the entire measure of value) is a
multiple of a one-year estimate of FCF. In this case, the only datum
provided by the company is the FCF for the next year. Therefore,
V, = FCF, x market multiple for FCF. (6)
Perhaps because of the simplicity of this formula, one might con-
clude that this comparable company approach (Equation (6)) to es-
timating value is conceptually distinct from Equation (5). But this is
not the case: they differ only with respect to the value of H. Equation
(6) is a pure comparable company analysis with no variation in FCF in
future years, while Equation (3) is a mixed version.
It is also the case that the pure comparable company approach of
Equation (6) is very much a DCF-type methodology. One way to show
this is to make the point again that Equations (6) and (5) differ only with
respect to the value of H; and therefore, since Equations (5) and (3) are
conceptually the same, Equation (6) is also a DCF-type methodology.
Alternatively, we point out that Equation (6) (the pure compar-
able company approach) can be restated in a way that is visually and
conceptually identical to the DCF approach:
V FCF + FCF2  FCF
( + rE) (1 +rE)
2  (1+ r)H (7)
In this equation, H is infinity, and the various FCFs are the same
in each and every future year. Although Equations (6) and (7) may
look very different, we note that the market multiple of Equation (6)
captures the value of a perpetuity in the annual amount of FCF, dis-
counted at the rate, rE.
Thus, the comparable company technique is just as much a DCF
form of analysis as what the courts usually describe as'DCF analysis.
The significant differences are, simply, that (a) anticipated FCFs are
on the reasonable assumption that, after making the appropriate adjustments, the sub-
ject company would tend to have its free cash flows valued at the same multiples as its
industry peers."); Agranoff v. Miller, 791 A.2d 880, 892 (Del. Ch. 2001); Bomarko, Inc.
v. Int'l Telecharge, Inc., 794 A.2d 1161, 1186 n.ll (Del. Ch. 1999) (accepting a com-
parable companies analysis even when the comparable companies are different in size
and scope provided that other chosen multiples will correct for the differences).
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the same for all future years, and (b) unlike the Gordon growth
model approach reflected in Equation (3), but like the exit multiple
variation reflected in Equation (5), the comparable company ap-
proach also depends upon the use (explicit or implicit) of a discount
rate estimated from the discount rate of comparable companies. 17
We recognize and share a preference, however, for the use of
whatever good, company-specific forecast data are available. Conse-
quently, the terminal value should be pushed as far back into the fu-
ture as forecasting ability reliably permits. For example, when com-
pany-specific forecasts are available for 10 years, then the market
multiple is applied to the FCF in year 11. The more years for which
reliable, company-specific forecast data are available, the further out
the horizon value can be pushed. At some point the company's future
forecasts become unacceptable because of diminishing reliability. At
that point, and in the absence of a reliable estimate of the subject
company's future growth rate, the CCA should be inserted. That can
be where H= 1, H= 10, or where Hequals any other value.
Invariably, in either appraisal cases or in standard financial prac-
tice, several methods are used either to confirm the results from
Equation (2) or to provide a range for the valuation. As explained
earlier, however, DCF and CCA are not conceptually distinct methods
for calculating the company's going concern value. Both are rooted
in the observation that the value of the company depends on its dis-
counted free cash flows. Equations (3), (5), and (6) are thus merely
different algorithms for calculating the value of a company's future
discounted free cash flows.
Since all of the different equations are simple transformations of
each other, the choice of methods is driven by what reliable data are
available. All of these methods should, or could, if the correct data
were available, lead to the same result. In finance textbooks, all of
these methods are taught as being alternative algorithms that are con-
sistent with determining the V, of a firm by discounting its future free
cash flows.""
117 When comparable companies analysis is used in appraisal proceedings, the dis-
count rate is effectively selected through the choice of a market multiple; the discount
rate implied in these applications of the comparable companies analysis is the recipro-
cal of the selected market multiple. PRATr ET AL., supra note 18, at 244 ("Multiples of
economic income variables (price/earnings multiples, price/cash flow multiples, and
so on) are the reciprocals of the capitalization rates applicable to those variables.").
118 Brealey et. al. discuss the use of multiples as a good method for checking the
validity of what we call the pure DCF approach in calculating the horizon value of the
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There is one other lesson to be learned from finance textbooks,
and this may be the most crucial lesson of all. In finance textbooks,
the above formulas for calculating the value of the firm are taught in
the context of how to value the common stock of the firm. That is,
the value of the stock is calculated to be the pro rata net present value
of all future free cash flows. There are no adjustments. No discounts
are assumed, and no premiums are added. The textbook equation for
the value of a stock is essentially the same as Equation (3), which
measures the value of the firm. To move from V to the value of the
stock, one need only divide V,. by the number of shares.1"9 We return
to this point on several occasions below, because if the finance text-
books are correct, there cannot be a persistent and continuously oc-
curring IMD in all traded stocks.
B. Third-Party Sale Value and Synergies
The value of the firm is not its third-party sale value (V).120 In an
arm's-length transaction, an acquirer will pay a premium to 1, in pur-
chasing the firm. The premium largely reflects synergies arising from
the merger, but it can also reflect benefits of control. 21 Assuming that
firm. BREALEYET AL., supra note 108, at 511. Damodaran refers to the use of multiples
as "relative valuation." See DAMODARAN, supra note 105, at 231 ("In relative valuation,
we value assets based on how similar assets are priced. We begin ... by noting that
most valuations in practice are relative valuation.").
119 See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 108, at 61-65. Ross, Westerfield, and Jaffe define
the value of common stocks in an identical fashion. STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPO-
RATE FINANCE 109 (6th ed. 2002). These textbooks define the value of a stock as the
discounted value of dividends and elsewhere define the value of the firm as the dis-
counted value of future FCFs. As Damodaran points out, these values measure the
same thing: cash flows to equity holders. DAIMODARAN, supra note 105, at 175. Damo-
daran discusses scenarios in which dividend discounting and free cash flow discounting
could lead to different valuations, namely when free cash flows are neither paid as
dividends nor reinvested in the firm. Id. at 188. However, these scenarios may repre-
sent a form of agency cost, which, as discussed in detail below, is appropriately re-
flected in (a reduced) going concern value. See infra Part II.C. To the extent that
these scenarios involve breaches of fiduciary duty, it can be argued that they should be
addressed by an offsetting upward adjustment in determining fair value. See infra Part
IV. In any event, Damodaran notes that his analysis switches freely between per-share
and aggregate valuations. See DAMODARAN, supra note 105, at 191 (discussing the dif-
ferences between these two forms of valuation). He makes no mention of a need to
include a discount when moving from a value of the firm as a whole to the value of in-
dividual shares. Id. at 191-92.
120 The term "third-party sale value" is reserved for those transactions where the
target and the bidder are unrelated and the negotiations over the transaction are con-
ducted at arm's length without conflict of interest.
121 See infra Part II.D.
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the directors of the firm being acquired (the "target" firm) bargain at
arm's length with the acquirer (the "bidder" firm), the target's share-
holders will capture some of the synergies in the sale price. Hence, in
true arm's-length transactions, third-party sale value will generally be
above the going concern value of the firm. Since the appraisal rem-
edy awards going concern value, shareholders will approve third-party
deals and take the merger price, rather than use the appraisal remedy.
It might be argued that V, should be the accepted Delaware
definition of fair value, rather than V, because it appears to be consis-
tent with the economic concept of value. This reasoning, however, is
flawed. There are multiple definitions of value, and some definitions
are more consistent with the case law's use of going concern value
than others. The definition of value used by economists is a version of
third-party sale value-that is, the opportunity cost of the asset in its
next-best use.122 The term opportunity cost is used because, if the in-
puts were not used by the firm, they could be deployed elsewhere.
The difference in the value of the firm's inputs in an alternative use
represents its opportunity cost. 123 The opportunity cost concept is not
a measure of going concern value, but a measure of next-best-use value.
This argument becomes increasingly muddled when its propo-
nents point to acquisition data as a measure of the value of the firm in
its next-best use-or, what we call its opportunity cost or next-best-use
value (Vo,). Opportunity cost is an equilibrium measure, and, in equi-
librium, all assets are already in their best use. Consequently,
That is, the opportunity cost is actually below the current use value of
the assets. In equilibrium, there are no third-party offers for the com-
pany since its going concern value is higher than any alternative use.
When a change in the environment occurs and synergistic gains
become available to a bidder, the firm's assets' next-best use is tempo-
rarily higher than its going concern value, reflecting the synergistic
gains that will occur if the bidder succeeds in taking over the com-
pany. In other words, prior to the consummation of the merger,
122 Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 2, at 126 (citing BREALEY ET AL., supra note
106, at 16).
123 ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMics 204 (5th ed.
2001).
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V"-> VE
That is, the bidder values the firm at a value greater than its going
concern value.
Companies merge today and not a year ago because new opportu-
nities have arisen that make the company undervalued in its current
use. Assuming that there are no further third-party offers for the now-
merged company, the transaction returns the company to equilibrium:
V, >VoC.
Consequently, acquisition data should show that firms are bought
at a premium to their going concern value. However, it is incorrect to
make the logical jump that these premiums reflect some kind of IMD.
The fallacy is obvious and analogous to the "dogs that don't bark"
metaphor: there are lots of dogs, and most of the time, most dogs are
not barking. Similarly, in any given year, the vast majority of compa-
nies are not involved in a change of control transaction. If all trading
in noncontrolling shares actually reflected a discount to a firm's V,
(going concern value), then all companies would have ready buyers
all of the time. The companies in the acquisition data set, therefore,
are not a representative sample. Instead, they are likely to represent
the relatively few companies whose common stock does trade at a dis-
count to V,, or companies where synergies have emerged that make
the combined company more valuable than the two companies oper-
ated separately.124
The legal rule that provides shareholders with going concern
value is efficiency promoting. Value is created in change of control
transactions, and the value belongs to the party that creates it. It is
124 In cases involving a third-party purchaser, the negotiations involving the sale of
the company typically result in the synergistic gains being shared by the buyer and the
seller. See TIM KOLLER ET AL., VALUATION 435 (4th ed. 2005). Consequently, share-
holders in a merger or asset sale may actually achieve a premium for their stock. How-
ever, they are not required by law to be paid the premium. See, e.g., Abraham v. Emer-
son Radio Corp., 901 A.2d 751, 761-62 (Del. Ch. 2006) ("[P]ure control premium envy
is not a cognizable claim for a minority stockholder under Delaware law.") (citing
Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1087 (Del. Ch. 2004), affd, 872 A.2d 559
(Del. 2005)); Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 306-07 (Del. Ch. 1994) (noting that,
even though a third party offered a higher price per share than that offered by a con-
trolling shareholder, the directors were not obligated to accept the higher price if the
controller's offer was fair); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Doctrines and Markets:
Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 793-96 (2003) (discussing the
general corporate law standard that "a controlling shareholder can sell control at a
premium that is not shared with non-controlling shareholders").
[Vol. 156: 1
THE SHORT AND PUZZLING 11E OF THE IMD
counterproductive to force a third-party acquirer to pay the entire ac-
quisition premium to the acquiree's shareholders. The result would
be a reduction in the number of transactions that achieve a premium
price for minority shareholders.125
We are not, however, making the stronger normative claim that
this is the optimal rule. We could only make this claim if the case law
could reliably differentiate going-private transactions that are truly
wealth creating from those that merely transfer wealth from the mi-
nority shareholders to the controller. While the courts are sensitive to
this problem and can address it when plaintiffs allege a breach of fi-
duciary duty, underdeterrence of the misuse of inside information by
controllers is possible. This is particularly true in the case of a short-
form merger, where appraisal is the exclusive remedy. With all that
said, as we describe below, the implicit minority discount does not ad-
dress this problem; other solutions that are consistent with financial
theory are available to deal with the issue.
C. Agency Costs
The third key concept is agency costs. To develop this concept, it
is useful to differentiate between two types of firms-those where the
owners are the managers, and those where there is a separation of
ownership and control. The former are privately owned companies,
while the latter may be either closely held corporations or publicly
traded.
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means were among the first to point out
that the separation of ownership and control provides managers with
discretion to further their own interests rather than the interests of
shareholders. 26 This separation of ownership and control results in
agency costs (AC), which create a difference between the values of the
same firm when it is owner managed and when the managers are not
the owners.
125It is similarly counterproductive to force a controller to pay a third-party sale
price when exercising the right of control in purchasing the remaining shares. In par-
ticular, there is no reason to assume that such transactions are being driven by the con-
troller's idea that the corporation's assets sell at a discount to their true value. Not
every corporation is a logical acquisition candidate.
126 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPER'IY 119 (1932) (pointing out that "having interests in an enter-
prise,... having power over it, and ... acting with respect to it" are distinct functions
that individuals may fulfill to varying degrees).
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Since publicly traded (and many closely held) corporations have a
separation of ownership and control, we will continue to use the term
V, to represent the value of the equity when the firm has dispersed
ownership. For contrast, we designate the value of the equity in the
firm where the owners are the managers as Vo .
We therefore have
V= Yo.1-AC.
Since the work of Jensen and Meckling, it has been recognized
that in transactions that disperse ownership (such as initial public of-
ferings), the burden of the agency costs falls on the owner-managers
who are separating ownership from control. As they noted,
the owner will bear the entire wealth effects of these expected costs so
long as the equity market anticipates these effects. Prospective minority
shareholders will realize that the owner-manager's interests will diverge
somewhat from theirs, hence the price which they will pay for shares will
reflect the monitoring costs and the effect of the divergence between the
manager's interest and theirs. 127
The agency costs thus reflect the assumption that managers will
maximize their own welfare, which will not be entirely consistent with the
interest of the shareholders. In its simplest terms, the owner-manager
may be willing to work 24/7, while the CEO with a 1% ownership stake
may work more civilized hours. This divergence also explains why owner-
managers are willing to sell the company at a price that discounts the
agency costs. After the transaction, the original owner-managers can
work a less hectic schedule. In addition, the original owners are willing
to bear the agency costs because they benefit from the ability to diversify
their wealth with the cash received from the sale. 1
28
Management actions that give rise to agency costs do not necessar-
ily involve a violation of fiduciary duties. Agency costs are as real a
cost as any other. For example, the amount of the CEO's compensa-
tion that exceeds the labor-market-clearing compensation of compa-
rably skilled managers is an agency cost. While such compensation at
times may be viewed as excessive, it is not necessarily or even ordinar-
ily a breach of fiduciary duty. In general, the existence of agency costs
127 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305, 313 (1976).
128 The agency costs are costs above the market prices required to hire comparably
skilled managers. The salary and benefits paid to managers for their services as set by
the labor market are regular costs and are not agency costs. Those labor market costs
exist whether the finn is publicly or privately owned.
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does not imply the taking of a corporate opportunity, the use of cor-
porate assets for private purposes, or engaging in conflicted transac-
tions without board approval. This is not to deny that agency costs
may include the effects of breaches of fiduciary duty. In our recent
article, we discussed how violations of fiduciary duty should be treated
in the appraisal setting, and we discuss this point in more detail in a
later section of this Article.1 9 In general, however, agency costs are an
inevitable burden on publicly held companies and largely involve no
breach of fiduciary duty at all.
One immediate implication of this analysis is that if the owner-
ship-dispersing transaction is reversed by means of a transaction that
aggregates share ownership, the shareholders do not have to be com-
pensated for the agency costs. This is true as a matter of both finance
and appraisal law. The shares sold by the original owner were dis-
counted by the amount of the agency costs, and therefore, the man-
ager retaking the firm private should pay V and not Vo, in the going-
private transaction. In the appraisal setting, the now-cashed-out
shareholders receive the going concern value of the holdings that they
sell, which are net of the agency costs.
Another implication is that the agency costs of the firm with dis-
persed ownership are reflected in the FCFs of the firm. The agency
costs concept includes the full cost of the managers' compensation,
including that part of the compensation which is above what the firm
needs to pay to hire the managers in the competitive labor market. It
also includes any higher supplier costs, employee labor costs, and
other similar costs that the managers allow to creep into the cost
structure because they bear relatively little of the loss. The agency
costs concept may also include whatever revenue sources are lost if the
managers are less attentive to customer needs once they are no longer
the owner-operators of the firm. Finally, agency costs include the
high bonding costs associated with the disclosure and other require-
ments of publicly traded companies.
Agency costs are thus another factor, aside from synergies, that con-
tributes to change in control transactions. In a corporation with dis-
persed ownership, the agency costs show up as costs in the profit and
loss statements. These costs go into the pockets (financial and psycho-
129 See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 2, at 145-48, 158 (arguing that "minority
shareholders have a right to 'fair value' that incorporates not only current assets but
also future reinvestment opportunities"); see also infra Part IV (explaining why the ap-
praisal remedy is superior to the IMD remedy for addressing breach of fiduciary duty).
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logical) of the managers. As costs to the firm, the agency costs are a
deduction from the corporation's going concern value. They also do
not necessarily represent breaches of fiduciary duty. In the cash-out
transaction, the reduction in agency costs accrues to the benefit of the
new owner-managers because it is their actions that produce the reduc-
tion in agency costs, whether attributable to lower filing requirement
costs, reduced labor or other costs, or any revenue gains.
In our discussion below, we address the normative question of
whether VM is superior to going concern value as a valuation standard
in appraisal proceedings, particularly in transactions where a control-
ler squeezes out minority shareholders. For now, however, we again
make a more limited normative claim-namely, that reductions in
agency costs arising from going private transactions are generated by
the controller, not the firm, and a going concern value standard that
denies the minority a share of such reductions promotes efficiency.
D. The Benefits of Control
In the earlier section on third-party transactions, we focused on the
potential for synergies as the primary gain from a change in control.130
That is certainly the case for arm's-length, third-party transactions, but
many transactions that trigger the appraisal remedy are transactions in-
volving a controller who cashes out the minority shareholders in a go-
ing-private transaction. Do control-related benefits arise in this situa-
tion? Exploring this question helps identify benefits in third-party
transactions in addition to the synergies mentioned above.
We believe that the finance evidence firmly supports a conclusion
that there are benefits of control-that is, in an acquisition context,
control shares can sell at a premium to noncontrol shares. This find-
ing, however, does not logically imply that there is an implicit minor-
ity discount, as the term is used in Delaware appraisal cases. Rather,
this finding merely indicates that control shares are more valuable
than noncontrol shares. It does nothing to establish that noncontrol
shares trade at a value less than V, a proposition that is the essence of
the implicit minority discount claim. What we claim, however, is that
the observed gap between the values of control shares and noncontrol
shares is attributable to the value of control, a value that, as we explain
130 See supra Part II.B (identifying synergies as a component of the sale price in an
arm's-length transaction).
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directly below, is not appropriately considered part of the going con-
cern value of the firm
In their text, Valuing a Business, Pratt et al. remark that a control
block has a greater value than a noncontrolling interest because of the
greater ability of the controller to direct the strategy of the firm.' 3 '
Pratt et al. list five factors that are likely to determine the size of a con-
trol premium: (1) "[t]he nature and magnitude of nonoperating as-
sets"; (2) "[t]he nature and magnitude of discretionary expenses"; (3)
"It]he perceived quality of existing management"; (4) "It]he nature
and magnitude of business opportunities that are not currently being
exploited; and (5) "the ability to integrate the acquiree into the ac-
quiror's business or distribution channels."
132
This list of causes of control premiums tells us a great deal about
why control premiums are not components of the fundamental or in-
trinsic value of the firm. At least four of the five elements that deter-
mine the size of the differential between control shares and non-
control ("minority") shares are not elements that a dissenting
shareholder can or should recover from a cash-out transaction. Item
(5) (the value of integrating acquiror and acquiree operations) is
clearly a synergy and not a component of value of the acquiree on a
going concern basis. Item (3) (the potential for improved manage-
ment) is less a synergy, but is certainly one of the potential benefits of
the change of control that cannot be attributed to the firm as a con-
tinuing concern. Why? Because improved management would not
happen but for the change in control. Put another way, "existing
management" (Pratt et al.'s term) is part of the company's "operative
reality" (Technicolor's term) at the time of the merger. Since share-
holders choose the directors who choose the managers, the share-
holders do not get the value brought by a new controller who
squeezes out the shareholders in order to make the management im-
13 PRATr ET AL., supra note 18, at 349. We follow Pratt et al.'s treatment of the
benefits of control because of the Delaware courts' regular reliance on their treatise.
For recent examples of the Delaware courts' reliance on Pratt et al.'s works in their
valuation analyses, see In re PNB Holding Co. S'holders Litig., No. 28-N, 2006 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 158, at *75 n.105 (Aug. 18, 2006); Gesoff v. IIC Indus., 902 A.2d 1130, 1158
n.159 (Del. Ch. 2006); Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 337
n.125, 339 n.130, 340 nn.133 & 136 (Del. Ch. 2006); Henke v. Trilithic, Inc., No.
13155, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, at *41 n.110 (Oct. 28, 2005); Andaloro v. PFPC
Worldwide, Inc., No. 20336, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, at *65 n.68 (Aug. 19, 2005);
NBC Universal, Inc. v. Paxson Commc'ns Corp., No. 650-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 56, at
*28 n.33 (Apr. 29, 2005).
132 PRAr ET AL., supra note 18, at 349.
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provement. Item (2) (the potential to reduce discretionary expenses)
is simply a component of agency costs and, for reasons discussed
above, should not be included in fundamental or going concern
value. Item (1) (nonoperating assets) may also fall into the agency
cost category because nonoperating assets are presumably potential
private benefits to whomever is in control since their use does not af-
fect earnings and other measures of business success.
The synergy-related control factors are excluded as a matter of
statute, and properly so from an incentive perspective. The party that
recognizes the potential synergies should benefit from them. The
agency cost factors are excluded as a matter of case law, and appropri-
ately so, since agency costs are a cost to the dispersed-ownership firm
and, therefore, reduce the V, of the firm.
The last of the five control premium elements, item (4) (unex-
ploited business opportunities), may be different, at least in part. In
one sense, a failure to exploit business opportunities might be chalked
up to poor management and treated just like other agency cost com-
ponents of a control premium. However, to the extent that business
opportunities are unexploited before the merger but are reasonably
expected to be exploited thereafter, their value is appropriately
viewed as part of fundamental or going concern value and should be
recoverable by minority shareholders in most circumstances. As we
explained in our recent article, assuming that the current corporate
policy of the firm anticipates exploiting a business opportunity, its
value then belongs to the firm and all the shareholders regardless of
whether it has been exploited at the time of the merger. 13 To this ex-
tent, then, item (4) should be included in the value of the existing
firm as the value of the firm's corporate policy.
134
Consequently, of the five factors mentioned by Pratt et al. as af-
fecting the size of the control premium, only item (4) can be said to
include an element of value that should be included in the amount
received by dissenting shareholders.
133 See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 2, at 145-48 (arguing that even minority
shareholders will be able to recover a proportionate share of reasonable expected
benefits after a squeeze-out).
See id. at 165 (including the value of unexploited business opportunities in
"fair value").
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E. Summing Up: The Pratt Diagram
The table below mirrors a useful diagrammatic treatment by Pratt
et al., which graphically expresses the four finance concepts developed
thus far (the value of the firm, third-party sale value, agency costs, and
the benefits of control). 135 The diagram also introduces another con-
cept-"discounts"-which we explore here and more fully below. 136
STRUCTURE OF DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS
Value (per share) & Valuation Method Premium/Discount
$40.00 .................... V,,, (includes synergies)
$8.00 (25% acquisition
premium)
$32.00 .............. V, (value of control shares)
$7.00 (28% premium for control/
22% "minority discount" for lack
of control)
$25.00 ....... V (pro rata going concern value)
$5.00 (20% discount for lack of
marketability)
$ 20.00 ............ Value of unmarketable shares
In this particular example, there is (1) a marketability discount of
$5.00 per share; (2) a "lack of control discount" of $7.00 per share;
and (3) a synergistic or third-party sale effect of $8.00 per share.
These three discounts reflect, respectively: (1) market illiquidity cre-
ating a lack of marketability; (2) the value of control; and (3) the syn-
ergies created in a third-party sale.
For reasons to be discussed immediately below, under Delaware
law a premium of $5.00 per share is added in appraisal to offset the
illiquidity discount.137 Put another way, the Delaware case law prohib-
its applying a discount for lack of marketability in order to arrive at
the fair value to be awarded to the dissenters. 13 On the other hand,
the synergies of $8.00 per share are not added as a matter of law.
135 PRATr ETAL., supra note 18, at 347.
136 See infra Part I.F.
137 PRATr ETAL., supra note 18, at 347.
138 See, e.g., Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989) (declar-
ing that in determining the dissenting shareholder's proportionate interest in the
value of the going concern, "the Court of Chancery is not required to apply further
weighting factors at the shareholder level, such as discounts to minority shares for as-
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So far, none of this is controversial. The controversial part in-
volves the so-called "minority" discount or control premium. In this
example, the discount is 22% (a 28% premium), which means that
the shares to the controller (absent the synergies) are worth $32 per
share, while to noncontrollers they are worth $25. The question is
whether, under Delaware appraisal law, the extra 28% belongs to the
controller or whether it is a component of fair value to be shared with
the minority shareholders.
As previously discussed, the shares should be appraised at a value
of $25.00 and not $32.00. The 22% "minority discount" includes the
agency costs and the additional value brought by any change in the
value of management. As we explain more fully below, 13 9 Pratt et al.'s
use of the term "minority discount" can be somewhat misleading. It is
evident from the context that Pratt and his colleagues are simply con-
trasting a valuation that is premised on possession of control (in his
diagram, the $32 "value of control" shares) and which, therefore, gives
effect to "changes that only a control owner would (or could) make"
from a valuation based on "income projections that merely reflect the
continuation of present policies." 
140
Pratt et al.'s treatment of the minority discount is on par with other
leading valuation textbooks. Damodaran discusses the control pre-
mium entirely as value brought by changes in management. He differ-
entiates between the present value of the corporation and its optimal
value, where the difference reflects the changes in policy brought by
management. 41 In a recent article, Damodaran is more explicit, stating
that "the value of controlling a firm has to lie in being able to run it dif-
ferently (and better) .142 Mercer presents a diagram similar to the one
presented by Pratt et al., in which (1) the "control premium" and the
"minority interest discount" are identical; (2) those adjustments equally
explain the difference between "control value" and "freely tradable"
"minority interest value"; and (3) the so called "minority interest value"
can be derived from a DCF analysis-i.e., a valuation generated "by
serted lack of marketability").
13, See infra Part III.B.
140 The quoted language is from Pratt et al.'s treatment of the subject in the third
edition of their treatise on business valuation, where they discuss whether a DCF analysis
produces a "control value" or a "minority value." PRATr ETAL., supra note 84, at 194-95.
141 DAMODARAN, supra note 105, at457.
142 Aswath Damodaran, The Value of Control: Implications for Control Premia,
Minority Discounts and Voting Share Differentials 2 (unpublished manuscript, avail-
able at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/-adamodar/pdfiles/papers/controlvalue.pdf).
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build-up methodologies that develop capitalization rates by estimating
required rates of return in relation to public markets." 
143
Having now seen that the so-called "minority discount" as ex-
pressed by Pratt et al. and others is simply a discount that eliminates
the benefits of control, we now turn back to the question of identify-
ing other forms of discount-namely, discounts for lack of marketabil-
ity and market-related discounts more generally.
F. Discounts
The subject of discounts from fair value is a complex one, and
perhaps more confusing than enlightening. Some of the complexity
is generated by the informal manner in which discounts are described
in appraisal cases and law review articles. Considerable mud has been
added to the water, moreover, by the somewhat haphazard introduc-
tion of the IMD into Delaware appraisal law.144 We think it can be
greatly simplified in the context of our Article.
We have noted three different measures of firm value: third-party
sale value (V,,,); the fundamental value of the firm as a going concern
(V,); and the value of the firm where the owners are the managers (V,).
The short answer to the discount/premium question is the follow-
ing: the shareholders should always receive the pro rata value of V,.
They do not, by law, and should not, by finance theory, receive the
pro rata value of Vo,, or V,, . When financial markets do not price the
shares of the company such that the sum of the share value equals V,
then adjustments need to be made. In these cases, the market has
created a shareholder-level discount to the company-level V.. Since
shareholders receive the pro rata value of the corporation (V), such
discounts have to be offset by an adjustment.
We now turn to a brief review of market discounts that sometimes
cause shares to trade at a discount to their going concern value.
1. Illiquidity Discounts
The one key type of discount is the one we already discussed-the
discount involving illiquid securities. Indeed, once the obscurities are
removed, this may be the only discount worth considering.
143 MERCER, supra note 88, at 199.
144 For a discussion of the haphazard development of the IMD in Delaware ap-
praisal law, see supra Part I.
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In a perfectly efficient capital market, there are no discounts from
a firm's value (V,). But not all corporate common stock trades in effi-
cient capital markets. Indeed, close corporations do not trade at all
on a public exchange, and there is no reason to assume that the sales
that are made between a willing buyer and a willing seller are at the
correct price.
It is widely accepted that illiquid financial securities will sell at a
discount to their proportional share of V to reflect investors' prefer-
ence for liquidity. 14 In such cases, the aggregate sum of the value of
the shares does not equal the value of the firm calculated using dis-
counted cash flow analysis. If all dissenting shareholders in illiquid
stock were paid the value of the stock, their payment would be lower
than the pro rata value of the corporation.
The result would be a windfall for the controller. Fair value is the
pro rata value of the corporation's V. If this were not the case, then
squeeze-outs of illiquid positions would always generate profitable
transactions for the controllers or managers who triggered the
squeeze-out.
The illiquidity discount needs to be corrected-and it is, under
Delaware appraisal law. In calculating the appraisal award, the value
awarded to petitioning shareholders is not reduced to reflect the illiq-
uidity of the shares they held. Instead, they receive their pro rata
value of the company, which correctly prices their shares.
2. Closed-End Funds
Many closed-end funds trade at a discount to their net asset value
(NAV), and the discount can be both persistent and material. The
source of the discount has long been debated in the finance literature
without a consensus being reached. Given the lack of consensus on
why closed-end funds frequently trade at a discount to their NAV, it is
145 DAMODARAN, supra note 105, at 508.
146 This assertion is settled as a matter of Delaware law. See, e.g., Cavalier Oil Co. v.
Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Del. 1989) ("The application of a discount to a minority
shareholder is contrary to the requirement that the company be viewed as a 'going
concern."'). In commenting on this paper, however, several finance professors took a
position less favorable to minority shareholders: specifically, they not only challenged
the claimed existence of an "implicit minority discount," but made the further (and
not inherently implausible) claim that shares purchased at a discounted price due to a
lack of marketability should be valued in a manner that gives effect to a discount for
lack of marketability, and that the contrary Delaware law standard gives minority
shareholders a windfall.
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unfortunate that one of the formative cases in the Delaware Supreme
Court's appraisal jurisprudence concerns the going-private transac-
tion of Tri-Continental, a closed-end mutual fund.147
In Tri-Continental, the Delaware Supreme Court identified the
cause of the discount as "the inability of the common stockholder to
withdraw his proportionate interest in the assets of the company." 1
4 8
This explanation is, at best, confusing. It is true that investors in
open-end mutual funds can cash out at NAV. Hence, the Delaware
Supreme Court's utterance is true with respect to the difference be-
tween open- and closed-end funds. The confusion occurs because
closed-end funds are much more like ordinary corporations with re-
spect to the lack of a cash-out option. If shareholders wish to termi-
nate their investment in a corporation, they have to sell their shares in
the financial market. The corporation does not ordinarily have to re-
deem the shares at the company's going concern value. 149
Ti-Continental may thus be one of the inspirations for the IMD.
Once the court accepted the argument that financial markets persis-
tently underprice closed-end funds because of the lack of a cash-out
option, then it is a simple, if faulty, logical jump to conclude that all
corporations trade at a persistent discount. As discussed above, the
court in Ti-Continental did not itself make this error. 150
Some have suggested that the observed share price discount in
closed-end funds is related to the illiquidity of the assets held by the
fund. If the securities held by the closed-end fund do not trade freely
in liquid financial markets, then one of the equilibrating mechanisms
of market efficiency is blunted. In such a case, arbitrageurs cannot
buy the underpriced closed-end fund and sell the basket of securities
147 SeeTri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71 (Del. 1950).
148 Id. at 73.
149 Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-
Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24J. CORP. L. 913, 921 (1999).
See supra Part L.A (arguing that the Tri-Continental court's reasoning in consider-
ing the discount for a closed-end fund does not necessarily apply to all corporations).
We do not want to push this theory too far because the court's explanation is incoher-
ent. On the one hand, the court emphasized that the problem facing Tri-
Continental's shareholders is that they had to sell their shares in the market in order
to be cashed out. 7i-Continental, 74 A.2d at 76. At the same time, the court did not
appear to believe that the securities of stock, preferred stock, and bonds held in the
portfolio suffer from the same problem. Id. The court offered another explanation
for the discount as well, with the explanation turning on the leverage involved in
closed-end funds. Id. But here again, what is true for Tri-Continental is true for Gen-
eral Electric.
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held by the fund.' However, the empirical evidence to support the
illiquidity causal argument is weak.152 Moreover, here again, what is
true for closed-end funds is true for corporations in general, indeed,
even more so. The assets of most corporations are plant, equipment,
intellectual property, and the like, and these assets are certainly more
illiquid than are the securities-even illiquid securities-held by
closed-end funds.
So what does explain the puzzle? To some, the discount (and the fact
that it varies inexplicably over time) reflects irrationality. Others, however,
offer rational explanations. For example, Berk and Stanton attribute the
discount to "the tradeoff between managerial ability and fees."
53
What is to be made of the different explanations? Suppose that
Berk and Stanton are correct in their assessment of the closed-end
fund puzzle. Their explanation is equivalent to an agency cost expla-
nation: managers may take in fees more than they deliver in perform-
ance. Closed-end funds, in this way, are like regular corporations with
managers who may have a better or worse than average ability to man-
age. Unlike open-end funds where the number of shares outstanding
contracts when they do poorly, the closed-end funds have a fixed
number of shares, so only the value of the shares changes. Hence, the
badly performing closed-end fund managers are like badly performing
managers of corporations. If the market anticipates that poor man-
agement will continue, then the discount appears and can persist.
154
151 See Berk & Stanton, supra note 34, at 3 ("If a fund owns a lot of restricted stock
or other illiquid assets, which do not trade freely, its NAV may not accurately reflect its
true value, in which case the fact that it does not trade at its NAV is not particularly
surprising."). Tri-Continental appears to be such a case. Tri-Continental's portfolio
consisted of bonds and preferred stock that equaled 60.8% of the portfolio; the re-
maining 39.2% was in common stock. Tri-Continental, 74 A.2d at 73.
152 See Berk & Stanton, supra note 34, at 3 ("[H]oldings of restricted stock do have
some explanatory power for discounts, but these holdings are small or zero for most
funds, so cannot fully explain the 'anomaly."'). Moreover, while the securities held by
Tri-Continental may have been illiquid, the assets of most operating companies are
even more illiquid. Assets of operating companies are heavily plant- and equipment-
related, and these assets rarely trade freely in secondary markets.
153 Id. at 2.
154 The method for calculating the V of the closed-end fund raises difficult empirical
questions, but is conceptually the same as the problems normally confronting the ap-
praisal court. The contending parties will present alternative calculations of the fund's
V. Presumably, the respondent is the closed-end fund itself, which is engaged in a going-
private transaction. In that case, the respondent's expert will do what respondent ex-
perts normally do, which is to paint a bleak picture of the future return of the fund, and
the petitioner's expert will argue the opposite. The difference from the traditional case
is that the evidence will be based on the fund's market price, which presumably incorpo-
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Because the Berk and Stanton explanation is generally true for
corporations, the closed-end story fits squarely with the agency cost
explanation developed above. The only difference is that agency costs
may be more visible in the closed-end context because the perform-
ance of closed-end managers-their ability to outperform the markets
versus the fee they charge for managing the portfolio-is more ob-
servable than the performance of corporate managers.
There are no new implications for Delaware appraisal law: share-
holders receive the pro rata value of the corporation's V,. In other
words, shareholders should receive an award that includes either the
extra costs or the extra benefits created by management's perform-
ance. In neither situation should the effect be understood as a "dis-
count" or a "premium." Any reduction in value, so explained, is not
due to illiquidity or market inefficiency. The costs or benefits are real
and should be included. Hence, in the case where value is reduced,
the shareholders should receive the reduced amount. They paid
(presumably less) for poor managers, and they are charged for it. 1 55
The agency cost explanation of the discount for closed-end funds
contains an element of irrationality on the part of the original pur-
chasers of the newly issued shares. The irrationality is that these
closed-end funds are normally sold at their NAV and then open trad-
ing at a discount to their NAV. These original investors lose out.
But this does not pose a problem for appraisal analysis. Investors
who buy shares at a premium to the corporation's V, are not pro-
tected. Indeed, the irrationality argument on the part of the original
investors is a small slice of a bigger story that emphasizes occasional
rates the market's assessment of the costs and benefits of the fund manager.
155 It is certainly conceivable, on the other hand, that a firm that is unusually well
managed by a controlling shareholder may have minority shares that trade at a price
greater than what the share price would be if the firm's ownership were widely dis-
persed and subject to control by less capable management. Indeed, one suspects that
this may be the case with respect to Berkshire Hathaway under Warren Buffett's man-
agement. While not asserting that Berkshire Hathaway's stock has been overvalued in
relation to its intrinsic value (which he defines as "the discounted value of the cash
that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life," BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY
INC., ANNUAL REPORT 77 (2006), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/
2005arn/2005ar.pdf), Warren Buffett has insisted that "fairness prevails when market
price and intrinsic value are in sync" and that managers can help bring about this re-
sult through their policies and public communications. Letter from Warren Buffett,
Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to Shareholders of the Corporation (Feb. 28,
1997), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1996.html. At the very
least, then, Buffett clearly rejects the IMD premise of inherent undervaluation in share
market prices.
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market irrationality in the pricing of stocks, especially in initial public
offerings. 156 In the broader context, irrationality is ambidextrous and
can give rise to discounts or premiums. Appraisal law appropriately
ignores both when it adheres to its standard of awarding the propor-
tionate share of the corporation's V, .
3. Nonvoting Stock
The question of how to treat nonvoting stock, restricted stock, and
different classes of stock in general raises continuing problems. Dif-
ferent classes of stock have differential control or economic rights, as
well as different limits on market liquidity. While Delaware law has
properly stated that there is no discount for market illiquidity, the po-
sition may be different with respect to voting and economic rights.
Take the case of a class of common stock that has no voting rights,
but does have the same dividend rights and a residual claim equal to
that of the voting stock. In many such cases, the voting stock sells at a
premium to the nonvoting stock, perhaps reflecting the probability
that the holders of the voting stock will exercise their rights to sell the
stock at a premium in a change of control transaction.
Suppose, however, that in a cash-out merger the voting stock is
not cashed out at a premium, and the holders of the voting stock per-
fect their appraisal rights. Should they be awarded a premium over
their proportionate share of the corporation's aggregate V.? Alterna-
tively stated, should the nonvoting stock be discounted relative to V?
In this case, the legal rule that the shareholders have a right to their
pro rata going concern value provides one clear answer to these ques-
tions. Specifically, since the two classes of stock enjoy equal residual
claims to the corporation's free cash flow and share equally in any as-
set sale or liquidation, both should be accorded the same value in ap-
praisal. A different rule would require recognizing and giving valua-
tion effect to characteristics of the shares themselves, an approach
that seems inconsistent with prevailing doctrine precluding premiums
or discounts at the "shareholder level."157
156 See generally ANDREI SFILEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 112-53 (2000) (surveying psychological and institutional evi-
dence that investors do not always behave rationally).
157 See generally Rapid-Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 801, 804-06 (Del. 1992)
(discussing the distinction between value at the corporate and shareholder levels);
Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144-45 (Del. 1989) (noting that Dela-
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The equal treatment rule suggested above, however, may prove
too much. We do not discuss in this Article the more complex prob-
lem that arises in the case where the classes of stock differ as to their
dividend rights or residual claims in liquidation. In this case, the
classes of stock could quite appropriately be accorded different values
in appraisal, yet such differential treatment similarly offends a broad
prohibition against taking into account characteristics that operate at
the "shareholder level." Exactly how or whether that differential
treatment might be implemented, however, is beyond the scope of
this Article.
III. THE TREATMENT OF FINANCE IN DELAWARE APPRAISAL LAW
A. Consistent with Finance, but with One Exception
Delaware appraisal law is consistent with the modern finance that it
implements 15 in most respects. In modem financial theory, the value
of the corporation-the going concern value in legal terms-is calcu-
lated as the discounted future cash flows generated by the company's
assets.15 9 In the appraisal remedy, the favored method for calculating
the fair value of the corporation is the preferred method in finance for
calculating the value of the corporation-that is, the discounted future
free cash flows or DCF.'Gt In both finance theory and the appraisal
remedy, the value of a shareholder's stock is the pro rata value of the
discounted future free cash flows (again using the simplifying assump-
tion that the corporation's investment is entirely equity). 1
ware case law allows discounts or premiums at the corporate level, but not at the
shareholder level).
158 As required by Weinbergerv. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983).
159 See supra notes 119, 155, and accompanying text.
160 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
161 See PRATT ETAL., supra note 18, at 31 (defining intrinsic value as "based on the
perceived characteristics inherent in the investment"). The fundamental value of the
firm is also close to the legal term "intrinsic value," although that term implies some
value that is inherent in the assets themselves and, perhaps, suggests that there is a sin-
gle number rather than a range of values. Indeed, if the required data were known
precisely, the corporation being appraised would have a single value, representing its
V,. Of course, the required information, since it represents estimates of the future,
cannot be known with precision. Informed individuals can have different views about
the future free cash flows and the appropriate discount rate. Hence, the result, em-
pirically speaking, is a range of values that define the corporation's V.. This is the ra-
tionale behind the traditional practice of using a number of alternative methods and
reasonable assumptions to create a range for the company's going concern value. See
BREALEY ET AL., supra note 108, at 253-56 (describing the Monte Carlo simulation
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In addition, the case law embeds the finance treatment of agency
costs.'62 The DCF method calculates the value of the firm net of
agency costs. Hence, the court awards shareholders the going con-
cern value, or VE, which is net of agency costs. The same can be said
for the value of control. As discussed above, the value of control in-
cludes both agency costs and the costs associated with synergies or
gains that would occur in a change of control transaction. Once the
case law adopts the DCF method to estimate the value of the company
(Equation (3)), implicit in the courts' conclusion is the recognition
that what petitioning shareholders receive excludes the benefits of
control and includes the effect of agency costs.
Delaware's appraisal law has also incorporated modern finance
theories in determining the appropriate discount rate. The discount
rate used in appraisal proceedings is typically estimated using the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the weighted average cost of
163
capital (WACC). Indeed, the Court of Chancery is so informed by
current thinking that it applies a version of the three-factor CAPM
theory. In particular, it will add to the discount rate an estimate of the
excess returns experienced by small stocks. 164 It also attempts to ad-
just for the discount rate effects caused by the higher probability of
bankruptcy in highly-leveraged firms.165 Finally, when using compara-
ble companies to estimate the company's cost of capital, the court du-
tifully adopts the mechanics of the unlevering-relevering process.166
The problems that arise with respect to estimating the discount rate
method, which produces a range of values to accommodate forecasting error).
162 See supra Part II.C (discussing the financial theory of agency costs).
163 See, e.g., Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 338-39 (Del.
Ch. 2006) (discussing the role of CAPM and its tensions with the "build-up model" in
estimating WACC); Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., No. 12207, 2004 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 108, at *113-14 (July 30, 2004) (describing the CAPM method of deriving cost
of equity in estimating WACC).
164 See, e.g., Gesoffv. IIC Indus., 902 A.2d 1130, 1159 (Del. Ch. 2006) ("The small-
size premium, although somewhat controversial, is a generally accepted premise of
both financial analyses and of this court's valuation opinions."); Del. Open MR[, 898
A.2d at 338 n.129 (supporting the use of a premium on small-size stocks, despite the
"great debate" over whether it is appropriate); ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d
904, 920 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("This court has traditionally recognized the existence of a
small stock premium in appraisal matters.").
165 Union Il. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Group, Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 362-63
(Del. Ch. 2003) (applying the three-factor Fama and French CAPM model because it
"helps capture the risk associated with possible insolvency and other problems in
highly leveraged firms").
166 See, e.g., Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., No. 20336, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS
125, at *58 (Aug. 19, 2005).
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for the types of companies involved in appraisal are well beyond the
scope of the present Article, but it is clear that the Delaware courts at-
tend studiously to financial expertise in identifying and resolving
those problems.
So far so good: generally accepted finance principles and the
Delaware valuation case law are consistent. Data limitations prevent
the courts from exactly replicating modem finance's valuation theory,
but otherwise they reasonably track any of the textbooks. But then the
remarkable divergence occurs. In adopting the IMD, the Delaware
courts explicitly or implicitly assert, as a matter offinance, that while the
value of the firm is the discounted free cash flows, the common stock
of corporations-even in the most informed and liquid financial mar-
kets-is persistently and consistently priced at values below the pro
rata value of the free cash flows. 1
67
If this were true, then the courts would be correct in mistrusting
the comparable company analysis for valuing firms. There is no fi-
nance textbook, however, that supports this proposition. To the con-
trary, most textbooks assume that for companies that trade in in-
formed and liquid markets, the value of the stock is the pro rata value
of the company. 16' No discounts or premiums need to be added or
subtracted from the equation. If the IMD were correct as a matter of
finance, the textbooks would say that the common stock is first valued
at the pro rata value of the company's free cash flows, but then dis-
counted by approximately 30% since only minority shares are being
traded. But we are unaware of any textbooks that make such a claim.
Consequently, the only weed in this otherwise beautiful garden of fi-
nance methods is the IMD. How could the courts, after dutifully follow-
ing the dictates of Weinberger to apply current methods of finance, have
latched onto the IMD? As we discussed in the section on case law,' 6 the
courts believe (or have been led to believe) that they are being faithful to
finance theory when applying the IMD. That is, the courts believe that
167 See supra Part I.D. Put mildly, the IMD is thus in tension with the observation
by the Delaware Supreme Court that "a well-informed, liquid trading market will pro-
vide a measure of fair value superior to any estimate the court could impose." Apple-
baum v. Avaya, Inc., 812 A.2d 880, 890 (Del. 2002).
168 See supra notes 118-119; see also Carney & Heimendinger, supra note 21, at 857-
58 ("The basic conclusion of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) is that
market values of companies' shares traded in competitive and open markets are unbi-
ased estimates of the value of the equity of such firms.").
169 See supra Part 1.
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they are applying finance theory when they recognize the IMD and adjust
for it. How is it that they arrived at this position?
B. The Supposed Finance Behind the IMD
To be fair, the Delaware courts did not invent the IMD; some of
the experts who testified in appraisal proceedings presented the IMD
concept to the courts, as we have already reviewed. 170 What was their
reference point? The main reference point was the case history dis-
cussed above, which emphasizes the happenstance involving the ex-
pert testimony that allowed the IMD concept to take root. Certainly
aiding this process was the courts' longstanding distrust of market
prices, a perspective also emphasized above.
A frequently cited academic reference for the IMD is John Coates.
In his article, Coates says that if courts determine fair value using ac-
tual trading prices for comparable companies, then those trading
prices include a financial discount. 7' The result is that a market mul-
tiple determined in this fashion will be too low because it reflects the
discount. Consequently, the comparable company method will un-
derstate fair value. Coates, however, appears to accept the IMD as an
empirical regularity and does not present an analysis of the finance
behind the IMD. Coates's only reference for this IMD claim is Pratt et
al.'s assertion that "[i]f conditions in the market for companies in the
industry at the valuation date are such that controlling interests can
be sold for more than the aggregate value of the publicly traded mi-
nority shares, then a control premium probably is warranted if valuing
a controlling interest."'
' 72
This assertion is unquestionably true. But it advocates application
of a premium only when "a controlling interest" is being valued; it says
nothing to the effect that noncontrolling shares necessarily trade at
prices below the V of the firm. The only reason one could conclude
that it does suggest such an adjustment is that it uses the term "minor-
ity shares." In Delaware's jurisprudence, discounts due solely to mi-
nority status are not allowed because the shareholders should receive
the pro rata value of the going concern. Like a number of other fi-
nance experts, however, 73 Pratt et al. use the term differently, purely
170 See supra Part I.
171 Coates, supra note 28, at 1265 & n.46.
172 PRAT ET AL., supra note 84, at 304-05.
173 See supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text (discussing alternative interpre-
tations of "minority shares" by other scholars).
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to distinguish valuations of control blocks from valuations of shares
generally. Thus, in Pratt et al.'s discussion, the term "minority" as a
basis for valuing shares is applied to valuations, whether achieved
through the use of DCF analysis or a comparable company analysis.
By the fourth edition, Pratt et al.'s treatment is very different.
Now, the authors are leaving nothing to chance. While the third edi-
tion was perhaps understandably misquoted to support the existence
of an IMD, the fourth edition cannot be so used. First, the authors
discuss how price to earning (P/E) ratios, one of the key market mul-
tiples used in comparable company analysis, vary considerably over
time and how takeover premiums vary inversely with P/E ratios. Spe-
cifically, they point out that share markets may overprice as well as un-
derprice: "Many times individual stocks, and even entire industries,
may be overpriced.... In such instances, a public market noncontroll-
ing interest stock price may be equal to-or even greater than-a con-
trolling interest stock price." 74 Then, the authors formally refute the
rote addition of the IMD. Specifically, they state that "[v] aluation ana-
lysts who use the guideline public-company valuation method and
then automatically tack on a percentage 'control premium' ... had
better reconsider their methodology."'1
75
In short, we submit that the Delaware courts, Coates, and others7
6
have mistakenly attributed to Pratt et al. a claim-that the IMD sys-
tematically exists-that they never made and that they now clearly dis-
avow. If there is any other financial scholarship on which the courts
or experts have relied to assert the existence of the IMD, it has not
come to our attention.
174 PRATT ETAL., supra note 18, at 355.
175 Id. at 357 (citing Shannon P. Pratt, Control Premiums? Maybe, Maybe Not-34% of
3rd Quarter Buyouts at Discounts, SHANNON PRAY'S BUSINESS VALUATION UPDATE, Jan.
1999, at 1, 1-2).
176 Professor Hamermesh was one of these "others." Commenting on Kleinwort
Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., No. 11107, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75 (June 15, 1995),
Hamermesh observed in 1995 that "the unadjusted use of comparative market analysis
as a measure of 'fair value' improperly substitutes a market value approach for the
'proportionate share of enterprise value' approach, and will tend to understate 'fair
value."' Chancery Court Appraisal Increases Market Value To Reflect Enterprise Value but Oth-
erwise Accepts Respondents' Claims and Adopts Valuation Below Merger Consideration, 14 Bank
& Corp. Governance L. Rep. (Computer L. Rep.) 860, 863 (1995). The fatal flaw in
this comment was its unsupported assumption that a share lacking control necessarily
has a value substantially below the proportionate share of the going concern.
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C. Why the Delaware Bench and Bar Fell into Error
Before concluding that the Delaware courts should return to their
initial rejection of the IMD, we consider it worthwhile to examine why
these courts might be reluctant to abandon the concept, and why they
might have been inclined to adopt it as they have.
Most directly, we suspect that the Delaware courts' embrace of the
IMD has arisen from the following two-step syllogism. The first step is
unexceptionable: A controlling block of shares ordinarily has a value
in excess of V, or going concern value.1 1 This value arises from legal
rights enjoyed by a controller. The bundle of control rights includes
the ability to squeeze out the minority at any time the controller
chooses. It also includes the controller's right to sell control at a
premium to the shares' market value.
The second step is the inference that shares that are not part of a
controlling block therefore trade at a price less than their proportion-
ate share of V. The acceptance of this second step was made much
easier by the work of analysts, like Pratt et al., who characterize ap-
praisals of noncontrol shares as "minority valuations.""" The second
step has also been helped along by the suggestion that minority shares
of a corporation that has a controlling shareholder tend to trade at a
discount relative to the V of the firm.179 Accordingly, the characteri-
zation of a valuation as a "minority valuation" tended to lead practi-
tioners and judges into thinking that shares lacking control necessar-
ily trade at a discount to V.
But the second step does not follow logically from the first. As
discussed, the relevant question is, "Who owns the value that goes with
control?" The answer is that control rights can only be owned by a
controller. Take the case of a publicly traded company that has no
controller. Efficient market theory states that the shares of this com-
pany trade at the pro rata value of the corporation as a going con-
180
cern. Without a controller, there is no value of control embedded
in the stock price. Enter a would-be controller who bids for the stock.
It is the entrance of the controller that creates any potential control
value-by capturing synergies with the assets already owned by the
new controller or by reducing agency costs through managing the
company differently.
177 See supra Part L.D.
178 See supra Part I.D.
179 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
180 Carney & Heimendinger, supra note 21, at 857-58.
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Noncontrolling (so-called "minority") shares thus do trade for less
than control shares involved in a change of control transaction. The
reduction in agency costs means that the private corporation has a
higher value (Vo, instead of V) than does the public company. But
does this suggest a wrongful discount?
The answer is that there is no discount to going concern value, let
alone a wrongful discount. The gains from the transaction would not
exist but for the going-private transaction and, consequently, the gains
belong to the acquirer by statute.'' Similarly, the gains in the going-
private transaction are not double-dipping from a finance perspective.
The initial owner-managers received a price in selling the shares that
182
bore the burden of anticipated agency costs and, hence, owner-
managers buying back the shares should be able to pay a price that
likewise bears the burden of such agency costs. In both transactions,
the shares trade at the firm's V with the firm constituted as a publicly
held firm. The minority shareholders therefore do not and should
not get either the benefit of the newly private company's reduction of
agency costs or the benefits of control.
What the IMD accidentally accomplishes is to introduce a "third-
party sale value lite" standard in lieu of the traditional "proportionate
share of going concern value" standard. Under this "third-party sale
value lite" standard, courts invoking the IMD take a CCA result and
add a premium based on company acquisition data, and from that re-
sult they deduct some estimate of synergies."'
Third-party sale value lite is thus similar to our VA. That is, while
the dissenting shareholders do not get the synergies, they do get the
benefits of control (in the form of reduced agency costs) that arise as
a consequence of the transaction. However, Vo,, is clearly not the
valuation standard established in Delaware appraisal law because it
awards not going concern value, but the additional value that is cre-
ated by the transaction.
From an efficiency perspective, replacing going concern value
with VM would promote some inefficiencies because it would deincen-
tivize value-enhancing transactions, as those who promote the effi-
ciency gains would not be rewarded for their action. However, Vo,
does have distributional aspects in terms of affording better protec-
tion to minority shareholders' interests. If one believed that the
181 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2006).
182 SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 127, at 313.
183 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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courts' use of the financial tools led them to systematically undercom-
pensate minority shareholders, then V , would ameliorate the prob-
lem. We discuss this issue in greater detail in the next section.
There may be another explanation, based on the concept of
asymmetric information, for the Delaware courts' willingness to em-
brace the idea that market prices do not reflect the going concern
value of the company. That is, managers know more than the market
and can manipulate information to their advantage. Since managers
are better off financially and enjoy greater job tenure when their pub-
licly traded shares trade at a high value, they have an incentive to
overstate the good information and hide the bad information.'8 4 It
might be argued, then, that this leads to publicly traded shares trading
S 185
at a discount since the market overreacts, negatively, to the prospect
of managerial overoptimism or concealment of bad news.
While the argument is correct as to the existence of asymmetric
information, it holds no obvious implications for the question of
whether market prices reflect going concern value. Suppose all cor-
porations wear comparably rosy glasses. When the market learns the
color, it will adjust all market prices accordingly. The market adjusts
to systematic bias in the predictions of corporate managers.
Of course, the analysts and investors may incorrectly settle on a
discount to apply to individual companies, but there is no reason to
assume that the discount is always too low. In fact, the bias has to be
unsystematic because the market can price in any systematic bias. In
other words, the market may sometimes discount by too much or too
little, and since there is no reason for the market to bias its incorrect
estimates in either direction, the errors will not lead to a systematic
underpricing of publicly traded shares.
Moreover, if one assumes that companies' public pronounce-
ments are made with rose-colored glasses, then the most suspect pro-
jections would be those of the company being appraised. This would
cause the appraised company's own projections to be faulty. However,
management projections prepared prior to the company's decision to
squeeze out the minority shareholders are treated by the court as the
184 Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Coiporate Thennostat: Lessons from the Recent
Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls,
93 GEO. L.J. 285, 306-08 (2004).
185 Coates makes the asymmetric information argument. Coates, supra note 28, at
1276 & n.80 (citing Victor Brudney, Efficient Markets and Fair Values in Parent Subsidiary
Mergers, 4J. CORP. L. 63, 71 (1978)).
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most reliable evidence of the going concern value of the company,16
and appropriately so. Projections made in a neutral setting, prior to a
decision to squeeze out minority shareholders, provide reliable evi-
dence of the firm's going concern value. In the IMD, however, it is
the stock price of the comparable companies that is under a cloud of
suspicion. Consequently, for the asymmetric information argument to
serve as support for the IMD, the untenable premise has to be that fi-
nancial markets are not only systematically biased, but are also biased
in the same direction all of the time.
Alternatively, suppose that the courts want to buy into behavioral
finance, which suggests that stock market prices reflect human errors
as well as DCF or, indeed, any theory that allows for systematic market
inefficiencies. Even with this supposition, the IMD fares no better.
Behavioral finance does not at all suggest a systematic underpricing of
stocks. Indeed, since the year 2000, behavioral finance has become
more popular, as a means of explaining irrationally exuberant stock
prices. 187 The claim then was that stock prices were far in excess of
any rational set of assumptions with respect to the growth rate or dis-
count rate used to calculate the corporation's discounted free cash
flows. The same is true of any theory of market inefficiencies. If mar-
kets are inefficient, as originally suggested by the Delaware courts in
Chicago Corp. v. Munds,188 then "dejected melancholy," otherwise
known as the IMD, gives way from time to time to "exhilarated enthu-
siasm."
In short, any theory with respect to market mispricing of stock in
relation to going concern value has to allow for stock prices that are
"too high" as well as "too low." The implication for appraisal law is
that the court could never simply assert an IMD of 30%, or any other
value. Instead, the court would have to adopt a case-by-case approach,
with experts opining on whether they believe that market prices for
comparable companies are either higher or lower than the pro rata
186 See, e.g., Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com, Inc., No. 19734, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS
75, at *21-22 (May 21, 2004) ("Delaware law clearly prefers valuations based on con-
temporaneously prepared management projections because management ordinarily
has the best first-hand knowledge of a company's operations."), reconsideration granted,
2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 84 (June 10, 2004); Gilbert v. MPM Enters., 709 A.2d 663, 669
(Del. Ch. 1997) (accepting management forecasts for DCF purposes absent evidence
of unreliability), affd, 731 A.2d 790, 798 (Del. 1999).
187 See, e.g., ROBERTJ. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, at xi-xii (2000).
188 172 A. 452, 455 (Del. Ch. 1934) ("There are too many accidental circumstances
entering into the making of market prices to admit them as sure and exclusive reflec-
tors of fair value.").
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value of their equity. We think that these are not waters into which
the Delaware courts will wish to plunge.
IV. PULLING UP THE WEED: DOES REJECTING THE IMD IMPAIR THE
UTILITY OR FAIRNESS OF THE APPRAISAL REMEDY?
We suspect that those who would advocate the continued use of
the IMD or, even more extreme, the adoption of a third-party sale
value standard, also hold that conventional financial analysis is inade-
quate to the task of protecting against opportunistic conduct by con-
trolling stockholders. We are sympathetic to this concern, but, as dis-
cussed in this Part, we believe that the IMD is the wrong tool,
conceptually and practically, to address it.
First, we find this concern attenuated, at best, in cases involving a
cash-out merger of a corporation without a controlling stockholder.
In cases without a controlling shareholder, the law governing control
transactions that cash out existing shareholders provides other sources
of protection. The shareholder vote on the merger affords a consid-
89erable check on abuse,"" as does the fiduciary duty of the board of di-
rectors, which requires the directors to obtain the highest current
value reasonably available for the shares.1 90 Indeed, assuming that the
board acts appropriately, the cashed-out shareholders are likely to re-
ceive some of the synergy value (in V,,s) and some of the value of con-
trol inherent (in VoM). More generally, any time that the squeeze-out
transaction involves a firm without a controlling shareholder, the
market for corporate control can work its magic as long as the board
fulfills its fiduciary duty to maximize the sale price.
The same is, or at least should be, true even in the case where the
going-private transaction is initiated by the current management. By
offering to buy the company for cash, the inside-managers-turned-
buyers have triggered Revlon duties.' 9' Independent directors should
shop the company so that shareholders are likely to receive third-party
sale value for their shares. This, then, is not a problem case.
189 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (c) (2006) (requiring the approval of a majority
of outstanding shares for a merger).
190 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986) (holding that in a sale of the company, directors have a duty to obtain the
highest reasonably available current value).
191 See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 (Del.
1989) (noting directors' duty "to obtain the highest price reasonably available for the
company," where two directors and senior officers were participants in the challenged
leveraged buy-out).
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The more troublesome case is where an existing controller
chooses to take the company private. Any independent members of
the board of directors can no longer shop the company because the
controller can vote its shares and block any merger other than the one
it is proposing. '92 This is a right of control, and it is not wrongful.
The board does have an obligation to secure a fair value for the
shares, and any purchase price is subject to entire fairness scrutiny,
even if the decision is made by the disinterested board members. 193 In
addition, dissenting minority shareholders can seek appraisal or quasi-
appraisal in the case of a successful allegation of wrongful behavior by
the controller. 194
Even so, we are concerned by the possibility of wrongdoing. The
problem is that the additional check afforded by the market for corpo-
rate control does not exist. The only possible transaction is the one
proposed by the controller, even if another bidder were to propose a
more attractive offer. Consequently, we worry that the controller may
try to steal the company from the minority shareholders by offering too
little; that is, by offering less than the company is actually worth (V).
It is this problem of controller wrongdoing that focuses attention
on the efficiency of the legal rule. If the controller can use its informa-
tional advantages, it may be able to take the company private without
paying going concern value. How can this problem be offset? Does the
IMD provide a solution? If the IMD provided a remedy to this problem,
then perhaps its failings in finance theory could be overlooked.
The IMD, however, is not well tailored to dealing comprehensively
or rationally with the problem of controller opportunism. Its most
obvious shortcoming in this regard is that it addresses only one algo-
rithm-comparable company analysis-used to estimate going con-
cern value. If the DCF analysis is used, then the IMD is not applied.
Worse yet, the IMD is aimed at the wrong target if information asym-
metry is the perceived problem. It is a deep stretch to say that the
comparable company analysis, compared to the DCF, is particularly
susceptible to undetectable manipulation by the controller, and the
192 See, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 919 (Del. 2000) (recognizing that the
board is unable to seek an alternative transaction opposed by a majority shareholder).
193 See Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79, 84 (Del. 1995) (describing
the "fair dealing and fair price" standard in enti-e fairness scrutiny); Gesoff v. IIC In-
dus., 902 A.2d 1130, 1144 (Del. Ch. 2006) (explaining that the entire fairness review
serves to protect the interests of minority shareholders).
G94 Cesoff 902 A.2d at 1155 (assessing fair value for purposes of determining dam-
ages for a controller's breach of fiduciary duty).
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courts make no such claim. If anything, the comparable company
method is more open to contestable claims since neither side has in-
side information with respect to the would-be comparables.
We claim that a solution that addresses the problem has to be spe-
cific to the potential opportunism of controllers. This problem is not
rooted in the trading of publicly traded companies. Instead it is rooted
in the behavior of the finn being appraised, and where this problem is
most severe is in the case of a firm with an existing controller.
One standard that does potentially address this problem is the VM
standard discussed above. Critically, and unlike the misdirected IMD,
it focuses on the potential problem-namely, that the minority share-
holders are receiving less than the value of what is being taken from
them. This could result from any of the agency cost factors discussed
above, including a planned diversion of a corporate opportunity or
excessive compensation for the managing controllers. While most
agency costs are perfectly legitimate costs associated with public own-
ership, agency costs will also include those excessive costs of self-
dealing that would be breaches of fiduciary duty if fully detected by
shareholders and sanctioned by the court in a fiduciary duty suit.
If applied like a mandatory IMD, however, the Vo,, standard would
be excessively restrictive of perfectly legitimate going-private transac-
tions. Fortunately, there is no need to change valuation standards be-
cause the going concern standard already allows for the inclusion of
the elements discussed above.
The adversarial appraisal hearing already allows the petitioners' ex-
pert to offer alternative forecasts for the horizon period for which an-
nual forecasts are available or for the growth rate of the terminal value.
In Travelocity, for example, the IMD was applied in a context where it
largely offset the inferior market position and future growth prospects
of the firm. ', The court may appropriately have been concerned that
Travelocity was being taken private as a prelude to the exploitation of
opportunities already available to the firm to improve its marketS 196
share. If that were the concern, the IMD may well have led to a cor-
rect valuation result. Under the approach we suggested in our previous
article, however, the IMD adjustment is unnecessary: the potential to
15 Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com, Inc., No. 19734, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *4-6
(May 21, 2004) (describing Travelocity's inferior market position relative to Expedia
and its limited ability to develop the "merchant model business"), reconsideration
granted, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 84 (June 10, 2004).
196 See id. at *22-23 (noting that management had dismissed its own favorable DCF
projections as unreliable).
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exploit opportunities available to the existing firm can be taken into ac-
count in determining fair value, because the squeeze-out transaction it-
self would not have been critical to the realization of the firm's poten-
tial. If these were the facts, then the Travelocity court could reach the
same valuation result-not by applying the IMD, but instead by accept-
ing the petitioners' claims as to the prospects of the firm. 
97
Specifically, what we suggested is that there may be cases where
the profit realized from the transaction occurs because of a diversion
of a corporate opportunity or other breaches of fiduciary duty. 98 Al-
though these profits do not occur immediately and are not already
generating profits for the company, they are profits that arise from
implementing a corporate plan that is already available to the manag-
ers and does not require the merger to implement. That is, the prof-
its are not "but for" the merger, and cash flow projections can and
should be adjusted to take such profits into account.' 99 The controller
accordingly does not and should not benefit at the expense of the mi-
nority by taking the value of what belongs to the corporation and its
shareholders as a whole.2 0
CONCLUSION
The "implicit minority discount," or IMD, is a fairly new concept
in Delaware appraisal law. A review of the case law discussing the con-
cept, however, reveals that it has emerged haphazardly and has not
been fully tested against principles that are generally accepted in the
financial community-the principles that Weinberger has wisely called
upon the courts to accept. In a body of jurisprudence that generally
attends to the teachings of modern finance-particularly in its use of
discounted future free cash flows as the appropriate measure of going
concern value-the IMD stands out as a concept that is foreign to, and
inconsistent with, finance theory.
Perhaps the introduction of the IMD concept into the Delaware
case law was facilitated by the allure of misleading terminology. By
correctly noting that control share blocks tend to be more highly val-
197 See id. at *18, *48 (stating that the court's fair value determination was $32.76
using a 30% IMD adjustment, compared to petitioners' low-end DCF valuation of
$33.70 based on management projections).
Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 2, at 158-63.
19 See Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 314 (Del. Ch.
2006).
200 Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 2, at 165.
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ued than noncontrol ("minority") blocks, Delaware judges and lawyers
may have been led to believe that shares, even in liquid and informed
markets, trade at a "minority discount," and that this "discount" un-
derstates the going concern value of the corporation. That logic fails,
however, because control share blocks are valued at a premium due to
particular rights and opportunities associated with control, elements
of value that cannot fairly be viewed as belonging either to the corpo-
ration or its shareholders. In corporations with widely dispersed
shareholdings, the firm is subject to agency costs that must be taken
into consideration in determining going concern value. A control-
block-oriented valuation that fails to deduct such costs does not repre-
sent the going concern value of the firm. As a matter of generally ac-
cepted financial theory, on the other hand, share prices in liquid and
informed markets do generally represent that going concern value,
with attendant agency costs factored or priced in. We acknowledge
that share prices on any given day may fail to represent that value ac-
curately, but we claim that there is no evidence that such prices sys-
tematically and continuously err on the low side.
Given the lack of serious support for the IMD in finance litera-
ture, we suggest that the Delaware courts may be relying on the IMD
for unstated policy reasons-namely, as a means to avoid imposing
upon squeezed-out minority shareholders the costs of fiduciary mis-
conduct by the controller. That is a concern with which we sympa-
thize. If that is the concern, however, the Delaware courts can address
it in a manner that is both more comprehensive and more consistent
with financial theory. Specifically, where either past or estimated fu-
ture earnings or cash flows are found to be depressed as a result of fi-
duciary misconduct, or where such earnings or cash flows fail to in-
clude elements of value that belong to the corporation being valued,
the appropriate way to address the corresponding reduction in the de-
termination of "fair value" is by adjusting those company earnings or
cash flows upward.
The Delaware courts have already expressed a willingness to make
such adjustments on a case-by-case basis by determining fair value us-
ing a DCF analysis. Likewise, they have properly refused to adjust DCF
valuations routinely upward on the basis of some perceived IMD asso-
ciated with publicly traded shares. Therefore, because comparable
company market multiple analysis is merely a simplified form of DCF
analysis, the Delaware courts should be willing to adjust the subject
company's earnings or cash flow measures prior to applying the mar-
ket multiple so as to compensate for control shareholder or manage-
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rial misconduct-without routinely adjusting every observed trading
multiple in comparable public companies on the basis of an IMD.
This approach to the problem of controller opportunism is more
direct, more comprehensive in its application, and more in keeping
with prevailing financial principles than the IMD that the Delaware
courts have recently applied in the limited context of comparable
company analysis. We submit that the Delaware courts can, therefore,
comfortably dispense with resorting to the financially unsupported
concept that liquid and informed share markets systematically under-
state going concern value.
